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CAN THE PRESIDENT CONTROL THE  
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE? 
Bruce A. Green* & Rebecca Roiphe** 
As the investigation into President Trump’s campaign ties to Russia grows 
increasingly intense, it is critical to understand how much control the President has 
over the Attorney General and the Department of Justice. Some critics claim that 
the President has absolute power to direct federal prosecutors and control their 
decisions. The President and his lawyers, joined by several scholars, take this claim 
one step further by arguing that the chief executive could not be guilty of 
obstruction of justice because his control over all prosecutorial decisions is 
absolute. This issue last arose during the Nixon Administration. The Department of 
Justice and the Special Prosecutor disagreed about whether the President, as head 
of the Executive Branch under Article II of the U.S. Constitution, could direct 
individual prosecutions if he so chose. The Supreme Court in United States v. Nixon 
left the issue unresolved and has never revisited it. 
 
This Article addresses the question of presidential power principally from a 
historical perspective. It argues that the Department of Justice is independent of the 
President, and its decisions in individual cases and investigations are largely 
immune from his interference or direction. This does not follow from any explicit 
constitutional or legislative mandate, but is based on an evolving understanding of 
prosecutorial independence and professional norms. 
 
American democratic discourse has included the value of independent prosecutions 
from its inception, and scholars have debated how much this concept influenced the 
initial structure of American government. In the late eighteenth century, federal 
prosecutors enjoyed a significant degree of independence from the White House, 
both because of the diffuse local nature of federal prosecutions and the vague and 
overlapping lines of authority. As federal law grew in scope and complexity, there 
was an increased need to consolidate and rationalize the legal arm of the 
government. Ultimately, the Department of Justice assumed this function under the 
Executive Branch. In 1870, when it created the law department, Congress was not 
overly concerned that partisan politics would infiltrate and undermine the rule of 
law, because at the time, expertise, including professional norms for attorneys, was 
considered the ultimate protection against partisan corruption. In arguing that 
professional norms operated as an internal barrier between the Department of 
Justice and the remainder of the Executive Branch, this Article contributes to a 
growing debate about intra-branch checks and balances. 
 
*  Louis Stein Chair, Fordham University School of Law. 
** Professor of Law, New York Law School. 
        We would like to thank the participants in the annual Legal Ethics Schmooze held at UCLA 
School of Law in July 2017. We would also like to thank Miriam Baer, Doni Gewirtzman, Peter 
Margulies, Ed Purcell, Jessica Roth, and Ellen Yaroshefsky, who provided thoughtful suggestions and 
guidance on earlier drafts. 
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INTRODUCTION 
As President Trump seeks to undermine the investigation into his 
campaign’s ties to Russia, it is hard to ignore echoes of the Nixon 
Administration. When Trump fired FBI director James Comey, and again, 
after reports that he planned to fire Special Counsel Robert Mueller, 
journalists and critics compared the incidents to the “Saturday Night 
Massacre.”1 In 1973, President Nixon directed Attorney General Elliot 
Richardson and Deputy Attorney General William Ruckelshaus to fire 
Watergate Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox; Richardson and Ruckelshaus 
each in turn refused and resigned, leaving Solicitor General Robert Bork to 
follow the President’s order.2 Unlike Nixon, whose motive may have 
remained unspoken, President Trump admitted that he fired “nut job” 
Comey in order to slow the pace or even stall the investigation into his 
campaign’s connection with Russia.3 
In an interview with the New York Times, President Trump claimed, “I 
have absolute right to do what I want to do with the Justice Department,” 
and warned that he was only permitting the investigation to continue “for 
[the] purposes of hopefully thinking I’m going to be treated fairly.”4 Some 
insist that by attempting to derail a federal investigation in order to avoid 
criminal and political repercussions, Trump was guilty of obstruction of 
justice.5 But one of Trump’s supporters, former Speaker of the House Newt 
 
1.  David A. Graham, The Saturday Night Massacre That Wasn’t, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 25, 2018), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/01/the-saturday-night-massacre-that-wasnt/551543/; 
Joe Sterling, Comey Firing Draws Comparisons to Nixon’s ‘Saturday Night Massacre,’ CNN (May 10, 
2017, 1:12 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/05/09/politics/comey-saturday-night-massacre/index.html. 
2.  See Graham, supra note 1; Sterling, supra note 1. 
3.  See Matt Apuzzo et al., Trump Told Russians That Firing ‘Nut Job’ Comey Eased Pressure 
from Russia Investigation, N.Y. TIMES (May 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/19/us/ 
politics/trump-russia-comey.html. 
4.  Excerpts from Trump’s Interview with the Times, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/28/us/politics/trump-interview-excerpts.html. His lawyers have 
made a similar claim. See Letter of Marc E. Kasowitz, Counsel to the President, to Robert S. Mueller, 
Special Counsel (June 23, 2017), as reprinted and discussed in The Trump Lawyers’ Confidential 
Memo to Mueller Explained, N.Y. TIMES (June 2, 2018),  https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/06 
/02/us/politics/trump-legal-documents.html (asserting that the Constitution gives the President 
“exclusive authority over the ultimate conduct and disposition of all criminal investigations and over 
those executive branch officials responsible for conducting those investigations”). The President’s 
spokesman and lawyer, Rudolph Giuliani, has echoed this theory, arguing that the President could shoot 
James Comey without being indicted. John Wagner, Giuliani: Under Constitution Trump Could Shoot 
Comey and Not Be Indicted, WASH. POST (June 4, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/ 
giuliani-under-constitution-trump-could-shoot-comey-and-not-be-indicted/2018/06/04/8107ed96-67e2-
11e8-bea7-c8eb28bc52b1_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.26f6519875b4. 
5.  See Can the President Obstruct Justice, POLITICO MAG. (Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.politico 
.com/magazine/story/2017/12/04/can-the-president-obstruct-justice-216008; Laurence H. Tribe, 
Opinion, Trump Must Be Impeached. Here’s Why, WASH. POST (May 13, 2017), https:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/trump-must-be-impeached-heres-why/2017/05/13/82ce2ea 4-374d-
11e7-b4ee-434b6d506b37_story.html?utm_term=.0bdc9638175e. 
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Gingrich, argued that “the president of the United States cannot obstruct 
justice,” because as chief executive officer the President has full power to 
direct federal prosecutions and fire anyone who does not comply.6 The 
exchange reflects a fundamental disagreement about the structure of the 
Executive Branch. 
This Article identifies and analyzes the flaws in the argument that the 
President controls federal prosecutors. Prosecutorial independence has 
become a cornerstone of American democracy, built into the way the 
country is governed. Although no constitutional provision or statute expli-
citly establishes prosecutorial independence, neither does any law expressly 
grant the President absolute power over federal prosecutions. It is 
Congress’s role to determine the extent of the President’s criminal-justice 
power, and Congress has acquiesced in the norm and practice of respecting 
prosecutors’ independence. Prosecutors’ professional obligation of federal 
independence, or “aloofness” as it is called in England, limits the Presi-
dent’s ability to control individual criminal investigations or prosecutorial 
decisions.7 The President retains the power to fire the Attorney General, but 
government lawyers must resist or resign if the President directs them to 
 
6.  Sumner Park, Gingrich: A President ‘Cannot Obstruct Justice,’ THE HILL (June 16, 2017, 
1:15 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/national-security/338147-gingrich-a-president-cannot-obstruct-
justice. Alan Dershowitz made similar claims immediately after Trump fired Comey. See, e.g., Alan 
Dershowitz, Opinion, History, Precedent, and James Comey’s Opening Statement Show that Trump Did 
Not Obstruct Justice, WASH. EXAMINER (June 8, 2017), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/alan-
dershowitz-history-precedent-and-james-comeys-opening-statement-show-that-trump-did-not-obstruct-
justice/article/2625318 (comparing Trump’s firing Comey to President Bush’s pardon of Caspar 
Weinberger). Professor John Yoo, who is best known for authoring the so-called Torture Memos, has 
agreed with Dershowitz, arguing that Trump could be impeached for his acts but could not be indicted 
for obstruction of justice because of his position as chief executive. John Yoo & Saikrishna Prakash, 
Opinion, Don’t Prosecute Trump. Impeach Him, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2017/12/04/opinion/trump-impeach-constitution.html. 
7.  For a discussion of the doctrine in England, see JOHN LL. J. EDWARDS, THE ATTORNEY 
GENERAL, POLITICS, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 67–74 (Wm. W. Gaunt & Sons, Inc. 1992) (1984). 
Even those who argue that the Attorney General in England does have a political role insist that 
political considerations ought not to affect him when he is supposed to act in an impartial or quasi-
judicial manner. Id. at 68–69 (quoting Sir Elwyn Jones). For example, in 1924, after the Attorney 
General dropped charges against a Communist newspaper editor at Labor Party officials’ direction, he 
was censured over this incident, ultimately leading to the resignation of the entire Administration. Ben 
Heraghty, Defender of the Faith? The Role of the Attorney-General in Defending the High Court, 28 
MONASH U. L. REV. 206, 214–15 (2002). In France, which has an inquisitorial model of prosecution, a 
recent law insulates prosecutors from interference by the ministry in individual cases. Loi 2013-669 du 
25 juillet 2013, relative aux attributions du garde des sceaux et des magistrats du ministère public en 
matière de politique pénale et de mise en œuvre de l’action publique [Law 2013-669 of July 25, 2013 
relative to the attributions of the keeper of the seals and the magistrates of the public ministry in matters 
of penal policy and implementation of public action] JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUUE 
FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], July 26, 2014, p. 12441. For a discussion of the 
increasingly ambiguous role of the French prosecutor, see Jacqueline Hodgson and Laurène Soubise, 
Prosecution in France, in OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (Oxford U. Press 2016), https:/ 
/papers.ssrn.com/ sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2980309 (follow “Open PDF in Brower”). 
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act contrary to the sound exercise of prosecutorial discretion8 because in 
criminal prosecutions—as in other contexts—the exercise of professional 
discretion is built into the structure of American government.9 
As the American administrative state grew beginning in the late-
nineteenth century, its architects took for granted that prosecutorial 
independence would serve as an important check on partisan politics. The 
Executive is not a monolith, but rather a myriad of agencies that enjoy 
degrees of independence from the President. The diffuse nature of the 
American Executive is not an accident. As the federal government grew, 
expert agencies served to limit presidential control. Prosecutors’ profes-
sional norms, experience, and proximity to the facts of a case comprise one 
such check. These norms are vital to protect the democratic values of 
equality and fairness in the administration of the criminal law from the 
encroachment of partisan politics.10 
By analyzing prosecutorial independence, this Article contributes to a 
scholarly conversation about the power of the Executive.11 It adds to the 
voices of a growing number of scholars who see the Executive not as 
unitary, but as a complex whole, whose parts serve as checks on one 
 
8.  For an argument that government lawyers have a limited role in resisting presidential power, 
see W. Bradley Wendel, Government Lawyers in the Trump Administration (Jan. 31, 2017) 
(unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2906422 (follow “Open 
PDF in Browser”). 
9.  For a defense of discretion, see H.L.A. Hart, Discretion, 127 HARV. L. REV. 652 (2013) 
(previously unpublished essay based on a talk given to the Legal Philosophy Discussion Group in 
November 1956). Many scholars have pointed to the dangers of prosecutorial discretion. See, e.g., 
Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50 (1968) 
(discussing the dangers of prosecutorial discretion in plea bargaining); Angela J. Davis, Prosecution 
and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 13, 20 (1998) (arguing that 
prosecutorial discretion leads to racial injustice); Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of 
Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 47–52 
(1991) (arguing that the duty to “do justice” is inadequate). Others recognize that discretion has a 
potentially powerful possibility to correct for errors in the criminal justice system. See, e.g., Bruce A. 
Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Rethinking Prosecutors’ Conflicts of Interest, 58 B.C. L. REV. 463 (2017). 
10.  Politics has multiple meanings. For the purposes of this Article, when we refer to partisan 
politics, we are referring to the personal drive for power or the efforts of a particular party to manipulate 
the system to gain or maintain control of the government. Politics can also, obviously, be a good thing, 
as it is the foundation of a democratic state. Democratic accountability rests on a healthy political 
debate in which certain individuals and parties embrace particular ideological and policy objectives. 
The difficult balance in the relationship between the White House and the Department of Justice 
involves ensuring democratic accountability in the administration of criminal law while preventing 
partisan politics from distorting and undermining criminal justice in any case. For a discussion of the 
roles informal norms play in American democracy, see Daphna Renan, Presidential Norms and Article 
II, 131 HARV. L. REV. 2187 (2018). 
11.  Compare STEPHEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE: 
PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 3–38 (2008) (advocating a unitary Executive 
Branch controlled by the President), with Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking 
Today’s Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314 (2006) (arguing against the unitary 
view of the Executive), and Jon D. Michaels, Of Constitutional Custodians and Regulatory Rivals: An 
Account of the Old and New Separation of Powers, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 227 (2016) (explaining how the 
administrative branch is divided among three rivalrous parts). 
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another. Not only does it provide historical support for, and an example of, 
“intra-branch” separation of powers, it also further explains the meaning of 
the term by demonstrating how lawyers’ professional norms provide a basis 
for internal limits on the President’s power.12 In order to ensure democratic 
accountability, the President’s legitimate policy agenda may shape 
prosecutorial priorities, but partisan politics and personal interest must play 
no role in determining the course of individual cases. 
It is not always easy to distinguish between legitimate policy objectives 
reflecting the President’s platform and agenda and illegitimate interference 
with prosecutorial discretion. The democratic system has grown to rely on 
lawyers’ professional norms to distinguish between the two. Department of 
Justice (DOJ) policies reinforce this core requirement, making it clear that 
experienced prosecutors whose professional obligations require them to 
filter out impermissible considerations, control decision-making in indi-
vidual cases.13 While this prophylactic is not a panacea, it helps to insulate 
prosecutors and protect against illegitimate incursions on discretion. 
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I surveys relevant law 
establishing that the President lacks enumerated or inherent constitutional 
power over individual prosecutions. This Part considers counterarguments 
based on the text of the Constitution, original understanding, and analogous 
executive powers, but concludes that, while prosecution is an executive 
function, Congress can restrict presidential control over individual prose-
cutions. Because federal legislation does not expressly allocate ultimate 
prosecutorial authority within the Executive Branch, one must look to 
Congress’s implied intent. The history of American prosecution and 
prosecutorial independence sheds light on this difficult task. 
Part II discusses the history and development of the federal criminal 
justice system and the centrality of prosecutorial independence to it. This 
Part analyzes the role of prosecutorial independence in American 
democracy by examining the historical relationship between the President 
and federal prosecutors. In the early republic, Presidents at times exerted 
control over federal prosecutions, especially when the cases had impli-
cations for other federal policy objectives, but most prosecutors enjoyed 
substantial—if not complete—independence. By the end of the twentieth 
century, prosecutorial independence had grown from the inchoate reality of 
a diffuse nation into a central principle of federal prosecution. 
Part III of the Article demonstrates that prosecutorial independence is 
 
12.  See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001); Katyal, 
supra note 11; Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power Within Agencies, 120 YALE L.J. 
1032 (2011); Michaels, supra note 11; Gillian E. Metzger, The Interdependent Relationship Between 
Internal and External Separation of Powers, 59 EMORY L.J. 423 (2009); Margo Schlanger, Offices of 
Goodness: Influence Without Authority in Federal Agencies, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 53 (2014). 
13.  Green & Roiphe, supra note 9. 
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not only built into the structure of American government, but also is a 
desirable feature of American democracy. The effective and impartial 
administration of justice rests on a healthy distance between the President 
and prosecuting attorneys. Helping to ensure the fair and just admini-
stration of law, discretion preserves prosecutorial judgment based on 
knowledge of the law, facts, and a familiarity and respect for process. 
Professional independence helps ensure that prosecutors will be able to 
exercise that discretion and seek a fair and just administration of criminal 
law in individual cases, rather than sacrifice justice to further political ends. 
I.  LAW GOVERNING THE PRESIDENT’S ABILITY TO CONTROL  
INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS 
Some scholars argue that a U.S. President can require the Attorney 
General or a subordinate federal prosecutor to initiate or dismiss a criminal 
prosecution and otherwise control the prosecutor’s discretionary deci-
sions.14 Others insist that the President has no such power and that, to the 
contrary, the prosecutor has a legal obligation to resist presidential control 
and to exercise independent professional judgment.15 This Part argues that 
the President does not have constitutional authority to conduct criminal 
prosecutions, and that it is for Congress to decide whether the Attorney 
General and subordinate prosecutors are subject to presidential control or 
must act independently of the President. The task remains to determine to 
whom Congress has allocated ultimate authority in criminal cases—a 
question on which historic practice and policy may offer guidance. 
A. Defining the Question of Presidential Criminal-Justice Authority 
The President has authority to set and promote criminal justice policy, 
to appoint and discharge the Attorney General, and to issue pardons.16 But 
whether the President may interfere in individual criminal prosecutions is a 
separate question that the Constitution does not expressly answer. Consider 
the following scenarios: 
 The DOJ conducts a corruption investigation of a city mayor 
who has been highly critical of the President. The Attorney 
General briefs the President that there is probable cause to in-
dict the Mayor, but that the prosecutors conducting the investi-
gation do not intend to seek an indictment because they have 
 
14.  For a discussion of this view, see infra note 68; see also infra note 82 and accompanying 
text. 
15.  For a discussion of this view, see infra note 68.  
16.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cls. 1–2. 
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reasonable doubts and do not think they can secure a con-
viction. The President directs the DOJ to indict. 
 The DOJ conducts a corruption investigation of the President’s 
former campaign manager. The Attorney General briefs the 
President that there is compelling evidence of guilt, and that 
the prosecutors conducting the investigation intend to seek an 
indictment. The President directs the DOJ to drop the investi-
gation. 
 A foreign government arrests a U.S. citizen for espionage. The 
President directs the Attorney General to arrest a prominent 
citizen of the foreign country when he is in the U.S. for 
business so that the U.S. has a bargaining chip. The Attorney 
General believes that the foreign citizen has not committed any 
crime, but that the DOJ can pull together circumstantial evi-
dence of a crime that will (barely) satisfy the test of probable 
cause. 
Assume that in each of these scenarios the Attorney General protests 
that it would be unprofessional to follow the President’s direction, or that 
doing so would be contrary to internal DOJ policy and guidelines and to 
long-held understandings about the exercise of prosecutorial power in the 
federal government. The President is undeterred and threatens to fire the 
Attorney General unless he complies. Is the Attorney General permitted, or 
even obliged, to follow the President’s direction? If the Attorney General 
capitulates and directs lower level prosecutors to follow the President’s 
orders, are they similarly required to obey? 
In Morrison v. Olson, the Supreme Court held that federal criminal 
prosecution is an executive function under Article II of the Constitution, 
not a legislative or judicial function or a function that the Executive Branch 
shares with another government branch.17 But designating criminal prose-
cution an “executive” function does not necessarily determine who within 
the Executive Branch has authority to make particular prosecutorial deci-
sions. Criminal prosecution is not among the presidential powers enu-
merated in Article II.18 Federal legislation creates a Department of Justice 
 
17.  487 U.S. 654, 696–679, 692 (1988) (“There is no real dispute that the functions performed by 
the independent counsel are ‘executive’ in the sense that they are law enforcement functions that 
typically have been undertaken by officials within the Executive Branch.”). While both the majority and 
dissent take this for granted, scholars have debated this point from a historical perspective, pointing to 
the fact that early federal prosecution was conducted largely by private parties and states. E.g., Daniel 
N. Reisman, Deconstructing Justice Scalia’s Separation of Powers Jurisprudence: The Preeminent 
Executive, 53 ALB. L. REV. 49, 56–57 (1988). 
18.  See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (“The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and 
Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of 
the United States; . . . he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the 
United States, except in Cases of Impeachment. He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and 
Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties . . . .”). 
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with subordinate prosecutors headed by the Attorney General who 
collectively have authority to conduct federal criminal prosecutions.19 The 
question remains whether the President’s authority as chief executive,20 
which includes a constitutional responsibility to “take care” that subordi-
nate officers faithfully carry out their law enforcement responsibilities,21 
implies that the President has authority, if he chooses to exercise it, to make 
prosecutorial decisions within the bounds of the law. Even if the 
Constitution does not itself commit control of criminal prosecutions to the 
President, is this authority implicit in the statutory establishment of the 
DOJ headed by an Attorney General who serves at the President’s will? 
The President—as chief executive—clearly possesses some authority, 
including policymaking authority, with respect to federal criminal justice.22 
As President Obama recently described,23 the President may establish 
priorities for federal criminal law enforcement, and need not leave this 
responsibility entirely to the Attorney General.24 The President’s policy 
priorities—for instance, a decision to defer to state laws legalizing mari-
juana—may have implications for individual criminal cases, at least 
indirectly. 
The President’s only explicit constitutional role in individual criminal 
cases is to issue pardons,25 a power used not only to grant clemency to 
convicted criminal defendants,26 but also to forestall federal criminal 
prosecutions.27 Congress has also granted the President authority to appoint 
 
19. See Act to Establish the Department of Justice, ch. 150, 16 Stat. 162 (1870) (codified as 
amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 501-599B (2012)). 
20.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United 
States of America.”). 
21.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (The President “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed . . .”). 
22.  See J. Richard Broughton, Politics, Prosecutors, and the Presidency in the Shadows of 
Watergate, 16 CHAP. L. REV. 161, 169–71 (2012). For a discussion of early federal prosecutors’ 
deference to presidential policy, see Scott Ingram, Representing the United States Government: 
Reconceiving the Federal Prosecutor’s Role Through a Historical Lens, 31 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS 
& PUB. POL’Y 293 (2017). 
23.  Barack Obama, Commentary, The President’s Role in Advancing Criminal Justice Reform, 
130 HARV. L. REV. 811 (2017). 
24.  See, e.g., Eric Posner, A (Very Reluctant) Defense of Trump’s Firing of Comey, ERIC POSNER 
BLOG, (May 11, 2017), http://ericposner.com/a-very-reluctant-defense-of-trumps-firing-of-comey/ 
(“The president is the chief law enforcement officer; he determines law enforcement priorities and 
policies.”). 
25.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (“The President . . . shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons 
for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.”). 
26.  See generally Rachel E. Barkow, Clemency and Presidential Administration of Criminal 
Law, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 802 (2015). 
27.  See Albert W. Alschuler, Bill Clinton’s Parting Pardon Party, 100 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1131 (2010) (discussing Clinton’s pardon of Marc Rich); Laura Kalman, Gerald Ford, 
the Nixon Pardon, and the Rise of the Right, 58 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 349 (2010) (discussing Ford’s 
pardon of President Nixon). As originally understood, it does not appear that the pardon power could be 
used preemptively in this manner. See The Jewels of the Princess of Orange, 2 Op. Att’y Gen. 482, 485 
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and to discharge the Attorney General who heads the DOJ,28 and this 
authority presumably has constitutional origins as well.29 However, the 
power to hire and fire does not necessarily imply the power to instruct 
subordinate officials how to do their jobs.30 
The Court’s characterization of criminal prosecution as an executive 
function does not mean that the Executive has exclusive authority in this 
area. In our system of checks and balances, the powers of individual 
branches are not always exclusive.31 In the criminal context, in particular, 
Congress and the Judiciary exercise significant authority to circumscribe 
and influence federal prosecutors’ decision-making through procedural 
rules and statutes.32 Congress can also inquire into prosecutors’ decision-
making in individual cases.33 Courts regulate prosecutors not only by 
interpreting and enforcing limits imposed by the Constitution, statutes, and 
rules, but by adopting rules of professional conduct and court rules 
governing the conduct of lawyers in criminal cases.34 To be sure, federal 
 
(1831) (opining that the President “can pardon or reprieve only when an offence against the law has 
been established by proof or the admissions of the party, and a penalty thereby incurred”). 
28.  See 28 U.S.C. § 501 (2012) (“The Department of Justice is an executive department of the 
United States at the seat of Government.”); 28 U.S.C. § 503 (“The President shall appoint, by and with 
the advice and consent of the Senate, an Attorney General of the United States. The Attorney General is 
the head of the Department of Justice.”). 
29.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (the President “shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and 
Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the 
supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein 
otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the 
Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of 
Law, or in the Heads of Departments”). 
30.  See infra notes 224–28 and accompanying text. The conclusion that the President is vested 
with “all” executive power involves an inference from the text that is not necessarily accurate. See 
Victoria F. Nourse, Reclaiming the Constitutional Text from Originalism: The Case of Executive 
Power, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 22–24 (2018). 
31.  As DOJ’s Office of Legal Counsel observed in 1973, “there are few areas under the 
Constitution to which a single branch of the Government can claim a monopoly.” Memorandum from 
Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, Dep’t of Justice, Re: Amenability 
of the President, Vice President and other Civil Officers to Federal Criminal Prosecution While in 
Office 21 (Sept. 24, 1973) (first quoting Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 209–10 (1928) 
(Holmes, J., dissenting); and then quoting Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 177 (1926) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting), overruled in part by Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935)), 
https://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/olc/092473.pdf. 
32.  See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1975) (governing production of witness statements and reports); 
FED. R. CRIM. P. See generally Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and 
the Threat of Tyranny, 86 IOWA L. REV. 393, 453–57 (2001) (arguing that constitutional history does 
not support federal prosecutors’ independence from Congress and the Judiciary in exercising 
discretion). 
33.  See, e.g., Broughton, supra note 22; Bruce Green & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial 
Accountability 2.0, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 51, 71 (2016) (discussing congressional inquiry into 
prosecution of Aaron Swartz). 
34.  See, e.g., United States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1988) (applying professional 
conduct rule to restrict a prosecutor’s investigation); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 674–75 
(1985) (recognizing federal prosecutors’ due process disclose obligation). Federal courts also exercise 
limited supervisory authority to regulate prosecutors. See generally Sara Sun Beale, Reconsidering 
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courts hesitate to interfere with prosecutors’ charging decisions unless 
prosecutors have clearly violated a constitutional provision.35 But, even in 
making charging and plea bargaining decisions, federal prosecutors act 
under some legislative and judicial constraints.36 
Congress and the Judiciary can, directly or indirectly, determine not 
only how prosecutors, as executive officials, make prosecutorial decisions, 
such as whether to bring or dismiss criminal charges, but also who within 
the Executive Branch can serve as a prosecutor and make prosecutorial 
decisions in a given case. For example, having vested prosecutorial author-
ity in a law department, Congress might expressly or implicitly determine 
that prosecutorial authority must be exercised exclusively by the Attorney 
General and subordinates in that department and not by others within the 
Executive Branch. Likewise, pursuant to its inherent authority over judicial 
proceedings, the federal Judiciary might establish restrictions on the 
exercise of prosecutorial authority that have the effect of excluding the 
President from certain decision-making. For example, courts might rely on 
their supervisory powers or the Due Process clause of the Constitution to 
require prosecutorial discretion to be exercised by lawyers who are free of 
political influences.37 
At present, no federal law or court rule explicitly calls for federal 
prosecutors’ independence from the President.38 The concept might be so 
embedded in our understanding of criminal justice that both the Executive 
and Judiciary have implicitly accepted it in the way that they exercise their 
 
Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases: Constitutional and Statutory Limits on the Authority of the 
Federal Courts, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1433 (1984). 
35.  See, e.g., United States v. Redondo–Lemos, 955 F.2d 1296 (9th Cir. 1992), amended on 
denial of reh’g en banc (May 11, 1992), overruled by United States v. Armstrong, 48 F.3d 1508 (9th 
Cir. 1995) (en banc); see also Darryl K. Brown, Judicial Power to Regulate Plea Bargaining, 57 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 1225 (2016); Bruce A. Green & Samuel J. Levine, Disciplinary Regulation of 
Prosecutors as a Remedy for Abuses of Prosecutorial Discretion: A Descriptive and Normative 
Analysis, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 143, 166–69 (2016). 
36.  See, e.g., United States v. Jacobo–Zavala, 241 F.3d 1009 (8th Cir. 2001) (discussing federal 
court’s authority under FED. R. CRIM. P. 48(a) to deny the government’s motion to dismiss an 
indictment). 
37.  In Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., the Court exercised its supervisory 
authority to overturn a criminal contempt conviction because the district court appointed the victim’s 
lawyer, who was not disinterested, to prosecute. 481 U.S. 787, 804–08 (1987). The Court left open 
whether there was a due process right to a disinterested prosecutor, but lower courts have found that 
there is, reasoning that prosecutorial discretion must be exercised by someone who is not obligated or 
loyal to third parties with interests in the prosecution. See, e.g., Ganger v. Peyton, 379 F.2d 709, 714–15 
(4th Cir. 1967). See generally Green & Roiphe, supra note 9, at 490–91 (2017). One might argue that 
presidential control violates the defendant’s right to a disinterested prosecutor, since the President is not 
professionally committed to exercising disinterested, politically-nonpartisan discretion. 
38.  Title 28 U.S.C. § 516 (2012) provides: “Except as otherwise authorized by law, the conduct 
of litigation in which the United States, an agency, or officer thereof is a party, or is interested, and 
securing evidence therefor, is reserved to officers of the Department of Justice, under the direction of 
the Attorney General.” The provision is not explicit that the Attorney General and DOJ officers must 
“conduct . . . litigation” independently from presidential control. 
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powers. Even if not, professional independence may be implicit in the work 
of contemporary prosecutors, as the courts and Congress—if not the DOJ—
have come to understand it. The courts and Congress may have constructed 
the law around the premise of prosecutorial independence. Is this premise 
effectively woven into the fabric of the law, and if so, is it consistent with 
the President’s Article II power? 
B. The Originalist Argument 
There is no clear historical basis on which to build an originalist 
argument that presidents have constitutional authority to direct criminal 
prosecutions and that Congress lacks authority to vest prosecutorial 
decision-making in independent subordinate officers. Early presidents 
occasionally directed federal district attorneys to initiate or dismiss prose-
cutions, but their authority was never tested and other individuals beyond 
presidential control also had authority to bring federal criminal prosecu-
tions. 
Many scholars who question the legality of internal limits on 
presidential power argue that the structure of government at the founding 
mandates a unitary Executive with full power residing in the chief 
executive.39 Others insist that prosecutors enjoyed a significant degree of 
independence in the early years.40 Without embracing the originalist 
approach to constitutional meaning, this Part concludes that the evidence 
from the early years of the republic is mixed, reflecting, among other 
things, a disagreement about the power of the Executive Branch. 
Control of criminal prosecutions by a chief executive is not part of this 
country’s received tradition: In England, before the American Revolution, 
most prosecutions were conducted by private individuals and prosecuting 
societies.41 Most colonial prosecutions were similarly initiated by private 
individuals.42 To the extent that public prosecutors investigated and 
prosecuted criminal cases in the colonies or—following the nation’s 
founding—in the states, there is no evidence that gubernatorial control of 
 
39.  See, e.g., CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 11. 
40.  See, e.g., Harold J. Krent, Executive Control Over Criminal Law Enforcement: Some Lessons 
From History, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 275, 286 (1989) (“From an early period, Congress limited the 
Executive’s effective control over criminal law enforcement ‘affirmatively’ by dispersing supervisory 
responsibility among various executive officials.”). 
41.  LEON RADZINOWICZ, 2 A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS 
ADMINISTRATION FROM 1750, at 126–28 (1956); J.J. TOBIAS, CRIME AND POLICE IN ENGLAND 1700–
1900, at 122–23 (1979). 
42.  Willliam E. Nelson, Emerging Notions of Modern Criminal Law in the Revolutionary Era: 
An Historical Perspective, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 450, 467–68 (1967). 
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prosecutors was the norm.43 Today, in most states, public prosecutors are 
independently elected and do not answer to the Governor. 
In the early days of the republic, federal criminal jurisdiction was 
extremely limited. The Judiciary Act of 1789 provided for presidential 
appointment of private attorneys, who came to be called district attorneys, 
to prosecute federal criminal cases,44 although an earlier Senate draft called 
for judicial appointment of prosecutors.45 Even though prosecutors func-
tioned independently of the Attorney General,46 presidents did, at times, 
direct how district attorneys conducted at least certain individual criminal 
cases.47 For example, President Washington both ordered the prosecution 
of participants in the Whiskey Rebellion and, a year later, ordered that 
prosecutions be dropped against two wrongly accused defendants.48 
President Adams ordered that prosecutions be filed under the Sedition 
Act,49 while President Jefferson, considering the Act unconstitutional, 
ordered pending prosecutions to be dismissed.50 Jefferson insisted that 
federal prosecutors decline to bring cases under libel laws and took an 
active role in the prosecution of his first Vice President, Aaron Burr.51 He 
also ordered a Connecticut district attorney to bring a federal common law 
criminal case against Federalist printers who had called the President 
immoral, but then ordered the district attorney to drop the case when it 
became clear that the defendants were planning to put on evidence that 
Jefferson seduced a woman.52 
Kate Andrias has called attention to an 1831 Attorney General opinion 
concluding that President Jackson had authority to direct a federal district 
attorney to dismiss a forfeiture action and to return the property in question 
 
43.  The public prosecutor’s origin in the colonies has been called a “historical puzzle.” W. Scott 
Van Alstyne, Jr., Comment, The District Attorney—A Historical Puzzle, 1952 WIS. L. REV. 125, 138 
(1952) (“[T]he anomalous figure of the public prosecutor in the United States stands out in our Anglo-
American system of criminal law as a historical challenge . . . .”). 
44.  Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92; see Susan Low Bloch, The Early Role of 
the Attorney General in Our Constitutional Scheme: In the Beginning There Was Pragmatism, 1989 
DUKE L.J. 561, 585–86 (1989). 
45.  Bloch, supra note 44, at 567 & n.24 (discussing the legislative history of the Judiciary Act of 
1789). 
46.  See id. at 585–86. 
47.  Saikrishna Prakash, The Chief Prosecutor, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 521, 553 (2005) 
(“Presidents Washington, Adams, and Jefferson believed that they had constitutional authority to direct 
federal district attorneys. In fact, each directed district attorneys to begin and cease prosecutions 
in . . . cases suffused with foreign affairs implications, cases involving the domestic political opposition, 
and even cases concerning the nation’s territorial integrity.”). 
48.  Id. at 553–54. 
49.  Id. at 559. 
50.  Id. at 561. 
51.  Id. at 561–62. 
52.  R.B. BERNSTEIN, THOMAS JEFFERSON: THE REVOLUTION OF IDEAS 189 (2004). 
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to the foreign royalty from whom it had been stolen.53 Attorney General 
(and future Chief Justice) Roger B. Taney rejected the premise that the 
President’s authority derived from the specific power to issue pardons and 
reprieves, but derived presidential authority to order the dismissal of 
prosecutions from the “Take Care” Clause of Article II. Taney maintained 
that it was necessary for the President to have this power, and he described 
possible scenarios illustrating the necessity.54 For example, if pirates stole a 
foreign sovereign’s property, the President should be able to order a 
forfeiture proceeding dismissed and the property returned, since “a 
[forfeiture] prosecution on the part of the United States might put to hazard 
the peace of the country.”55 And since this power was not specifically 
granted by the Constitution in cases of necessity, the opinion reasoned, it 
must derive from a general grant of authority that would apply equally 
whether the prosecution implicated national or only private interests, as 
long as “the public interest or the principles of justice required the 
President to act.”56 Likewise, the opinion reasoned, if a district attorney 
brought an unjust prosecution to oppress an individual, the most obvious 
way for the President to ensure the law’s faithful execution would be to 
order the district attorney to dismiss it.57 And in cases of significant impor-
tance, a district attorney might hesitate to move to dismiss the case, or a 
court might refuse to grant the district attorney’s motion, without the 
President’s direction.58 
Scholars have debated the constitutional significance of this history.59 
Given that early presidents asserted occasional control over individual 
prosecutions, Andrias and Prakash argue that the Founders understood that 
criminal prosecution is an executive power that a President may choose to 
control.60 But early prosecutors never objected or tested the President’s 
authority in court, and assuming that the early history reflects presidential 
 
53.  Kate Andrias, The President’s Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1031, 1051–53 (2013) 
(discussing The Jewels of the Princess of Orange, 2 Op. Att’y Gen. 482 (1831)). Although the forfeiture 
action was technically a civil action, the opinion did not distinguish between civil and criminal cases. 
54.  The Jewels of the Princess Orange, 2 Op. Att’y Gen. 482, 487 (1831) (“Cases readily suggest 
themselves which show the necessity of such a power to enable [the President] to discharge this duty.”). 
55.  Id. at 488. 
56.  Id. 
57.  Id. at 489 (“[S]uch a prosecution would not be a faithful execution of the law; and upon the 
President being satisfied that the forms of law were abused for such a purpose, and being bound to take 
care that the law was faithfully executed, it would become his duty to take measures to correct the 
procedure. And the most natural and proper measure to accomplish that object would be, to order the 
district attorney to discontinue the prosecution.”). 
58.  Id. at 490. 
59.  See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 70–71 (1994) (arguing that criminal prosecution was not exclusively a federal 
executive function). 
60.  See, e.g., Andrias, supra note 53, at 1051–53; Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, 
The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 658–59 (1994). 
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authority to control federal prosecutors, one cannot say whether the 
authority was implicit in the Constitution or in legislation. Moreover, 
others note that, in the early years of the republic, criminal prosecutions 
were concurrently conducted by state prosecutors, private persons, and 
federal officials who functioned independently of the President, except in 
rare cases, which suggests that Congress may, if it chooses, vest prosecu-
torial authority in subordinate officials who are independent of the 
President.61 The early history might suggest an intermediate position. 
Although the early presidential involvement in criminal prosecution was 
justified as an exercise of authority to “take care” that federal laws are 
faithfully exercised,62 most of the reported examples seem to implicate 
other presidential powers and, in particular, the power to conduct foreign 
affairs.63 One might argue that, rather than possessing plenary authority 
over criminal prosecutions, presidents could supersede ordinary prose-
cutorial independence only in cases where enumerated presidential powers 
were implicated. 
C. The Contemporary Debate Over Presidential Criminal-Justice 
Authority 
In modern times, as far as the public record reflects, contemporary U.S. 
presidents do not ordinarily seek to control or direct prosecutors’ conduct 
of individual federal criminal cases.64 Attorneys general occasionally 
 
61.  See, e.g., Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 59, at 108 (“As we have seen, the framers did not 
believe that prosecutorial authority need be concentrated in the President operating through the 
Attorney General.”); id. at 118 (“With respect to implementation of the laws, history suggests that the 
framers understood Congress to have broad power to structure government arrangements as it saw fit. 
Many prosecutors, state as well as federal, were free from the control of the Attorney General and the 
President.”); Reisman, supra note 17, at 56–57; Charles Tiefer, The Constitutionality of Independent 
Officers as Checks on Abuses of Executive Power, 63 B.U. L. REV. 59, 91 (1983) (observing that “the 
Attorney General did not attain centralized control of litigation until the 1860’s, when the Department 
of Justice finally was created”); cf. Bloch, supra note 44, at 634 (“The early legislators do not appear to 
have been concerned with . . . strong presidential control over the Attorney General.”). 
62.  Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 60, at 553; see also John Yoo, George Washington and the 
Executive Power, 5 U. ST. THOMAS J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 12 (2010). 
63.  See supra notes 46–54 and accompanying text. 
64.  See, e.g., Obama, supra note 23, at 823 (“[P]articular criminal matters are not directed by the 
President personally but are handled by career prosecutors and law enforcement officials who are 
dedicated to serving the public and promoting public safety. The President does not and should not 
decide who or what to investigate or prosecute or when an investigation or prosecution should happen.” 
(citing Kate Andrias, The President’s Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1031, 1051 (2013)); 
Theodore B. Olson, The Advocate as Friend: The Solicitor General’s Stewardship Through the 
Example of Rex E. Lee, 2003 BYU L. REV. 1, 146–47 (Seth Waxman observed that in “cases [that] may 
have appeared to the outside world as paradigmatically cases in which we would be hearing from the 
White House, or talking to the White House, . . . [no] effort [was] made by any political person to 
intrude in our decision-making policy”). Although President Trump has expressed a desire in speeches 
and on social media that the DOJ take various actions, as of this writing it does not appear that he has 
directly ordered the Attorney General or other DOJ officials to bring or end an investigation or 
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consult with the President regarding individual cases.65 But, presidents do 
not, as a general matter, tell the FBI when to initiate or terminate particular 
investigations. Nor do they direct federal prosecutors whether charges 
against an individual should be presented to the grand jury or how pending 
charges should be prosecuted. In general, prosecutors’ discretion to 
determine whether or not to pursue criminal charges—whether based on 
the extent of the evidence of guilt, on considerations of proportionality, or 
on other considerations—is considered to be a defining feature of their 
work.66 While there are no universally accepted principles to guide 
prosecutorial discretion, there is a consensus that decisions should not take 
account of public officials’ self-interest or partisan politics.67 
Ever since the 2016 presidential election, the question of who has 
power to direct criminal prosecutions has become critical. Responding to 
candidate Donald Trump’s call to “lock up” his Democratic rival, Hillary 
Clinton, experts considered whether, if elected, Trump could order a 
prosecution to be initiated.68 And in connection with discussions of whether 
President Trump’s firing of FBI Director James Comey might have been an 
effort to obstruct the federal investigation of the administration’s Russian 
 
prosecution or to take other specific action in a matter. See, e.g., Charlie Savage, Trump Crosses a New 
Line, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2018, at A14 (discussing President Trump’s Twitter post: “I hereby demand, 
and will do so officially tomorrow, that the Department of Justice look into whether or not the FBI/DOJ 
infiltrated or surveilled the Trump Campaign for Political Purposes—and if any such demands or 
requests were made by people within the Obama Administration!”). 
65.  See, e.g., Lonnie T. Brown, Jr., A Tale of Prosecutorial Indiscretion: Ramsey Clark and the 
Selective Non-Prosecution of Stokely Carmichael, 62 S.C. L. REV. 1, 22–23 (2010) (describing a 
meeting at which President Johnson and his cabinet discussed the possibility of bringing conspiracy 
charges against black leaders for inciting urban riots). 
66.  On the origins of federal prosecutorial discretion, see Rebecca Krauss, The Theory of 
Prosecutorial Discretion in Federal Law: Origins and Development, 6 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 1, 13–26 
(2009). 
67.  See Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Prosecutorial Neutrality, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 837, 
856–59 (2004). 
68.  Compare, e.g., Roger Parloff, Could a President Donald Trump Prosecute Hillary Clinton?, 
FORTUNE (Oct. 10, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/10/10/donald-trump-special-prosecutor-hillary-
clinton/ (“[A] President Trump would not have legal authority to direct the Attorney General to appoint 
a special prosecutor to ‘look into’ Hillary Clinton’s email situation or the Clinton Foundation or 
anything else. That’s not within a President’s power.” (quoting Laurence Tribe)), and id. (“It is essential 
that the Department be apolitical with respect to its choice of law enforcement targets and to its exercise 
of prosecutorial discretion. And very improper if the president were to be making phone calls to the 
attorney general with respect to a particular target of investigation. . . . If it had been revealed to have 
happened in the past it would have been a scandal.” (quoting Jim Jacobs)), with FBI Investigators Will 
Go Public If Obama’s Attorney General Does Not Indict Hillary Clinton, INFOWARS (Jan. 25, 2016), 
https://www.infowars.com/fbi-investigators-will-go-public-if-obamas-attorney-general-does-not-indict-
hillary-clinton/ (“The fact is that the president can direct the attorney general not to bring charges. The 
attorney general works for the president and the president can order that . . . .” (quoting former Attorney 
General Michael Mukasey)); Neal Katyal, Trump or Congress Can Still Block Robert Mueller. I Know. 
I Wrote the Rules., WASH. POST POSTEVERYTHING (May 19, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com 
/posteverything/wp/2017/05/19/politics-could-still-block-muellers-investigation-i-know-i-wrote-the 
rules/?utm_term=.c3108a252ad6. 
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ties, several addressed whether the President’s executive authority would 
extend to terminating the investigation altogether, were he to so desire.69 
Most recently, amidst rumors that the administration may try to discredit 
and ultimately order the dismissal of Special Counsel Robert Mueller, 
commentators disagree about whether this would amount to a criminal 
obstruction of justice, an illegitimate use of his power, or a lawful exercise 
of executive power.70 
To some experts, it seems obvious that presidents lack authority to 
make decisions such as these, and that if the President sought to direct 
prosecutors’ conduct of individual criminal cases, the Attorney General and 
subordinate officials and prosecutors in the DOJ would have a 
responsibility to resist and to exercise independent professional judgment.71 
Others, however, think it just as obvious that, as chief executive, presidents 
do have this power, even if they have good reason to refrain from using it.72 
And yet others regard the question as simply unresolved.73 
The question of the President’s authority as chief executive to make 
decisions in individual criminal cases arose prominently during the 
Watergate investigation. When Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox 
subpoenaed President Nixon for tapes and documents, the President’s 
counsel moved to quash the subpoena, arguing, in part, that the Judiciary 
could not compel the President to produce evidence in a federal criminal 
 
69.  See, e.g., Frank O. Bowman, III, Obstruction of Justice: Part 3—The mental state of acting 
‘corruptly,’ IMPEACHABLE OFFENSES? (July 2, 2017), https://impeachableoffenses.net/2017/07/02/ 
obstruction-of-justice-part-3-the-mental-state-of-acting-corruptly (“Although there has arisen a well-
understood norm that presidents should not directly intervene in criminal investigations or prosecutions, 
particularly if the case involves persons close to the president, that is a norm, not a rule. . . . [A]s a 
constitutional matter, it would appear that a president has the same authority as the Attorney General, 
the FBI Director, or any of their subordinates to decline even a legally meritorious prosecution.”). 
70.  See Eric Columbus, Could Trump Fire Mueller? It’s Complicated., POLITICO (Aug. 3, 2017), 
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/08/03/could-trump-fire-mueller-its-complicated-21545 
3. Firing the Special Prosecutor is more likely to be perceived as an act of obstruction if prosecutorial 
independence forecloses the President from directing criminal investigations and prosecutions. 
71.  See sources cited supra note 68. 
72.  See, e.g., Andrew C. McCarthy, The President’s Power to End a Criminal Investigation, 
NAT’L REV. (May 20, 2017, 9:00 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/447801/president-trump-
prosecutorial-discretion-obstruction-justice-fbi-director-james-comey-criminal-justice-system (“A pru-
dent president will not interfere in law-enforcement decisions. But that is because doing so would be 
counterproductive and politically damaging. It would not be unlawful.”). A related argument might be 
that, absent a universal commitment to prosecutorial independence, a President can control government 
lawyers’ work as a practical matter by hiring an Attorney General whose primary loyalty is to the 
Administration. See William P. Marshall, Break Up the Presidency? Governors, State Attorneys 
General, and Lessons from the Divided Executive, 115 YALE L.J. 2446, 2471 (2006) (“[B]y his power 
of appointment or otherwise, the President can assure that the Attorney General’s and Department of 
Justice’s primary fealty is to his administration and not to some abstract view of the law.”). 
73.  See, e.g., Broughton, supra note 22. 
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investigation because the President had ultimate control over the conduct of 
such investigations.74 
The brief for the President began with the uncontroversial principle that 
the Attorney General has discretion over whom to charge and control over 
other prosecutorial decisions in federal criminal cases.75 The brief then 
asserted that the Attorney General’s authority was merely derivative of that 
of the President, who has constitutional authority under Article II to “take 
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”76 In support, the brief quoted 
various federal court decisions that made passing references to the 
President as “Chief Magistrate”77 and to the Attorney General as “the 
President’s surrogate”78 and “the hand of the president.”79 It follows, the 
brief argued, that the President could in theory decide whether or not to 
prosecute a particular case, and in a grave enough case, such as one 
involving national security, the conduct of foreign policy or an interbranch 
dispute, a President might in fact exercise this authority.80 By way of 
illustration, the brief cited a Civil War–era decision upholding the 
President’s statutory authority to confiscate rebels’ property.81 But the 
decision is plainly off point.82 
The next month Yale law professor Alexander Bickel published a 
 
74.  Reply Brief at 999–1000, In re Subpoena to Nixon, 360 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1973) (Misc. No. 
47-73) [hereinafter Reply Brief], reprinted in 9 WKLY. COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 
999. 
75.  Id. 
76.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
77.  Reply Brief, supra note 74, at 1001–02 (first quoting United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 34 
(C.C.D. Va. 1807) (14,692); and then quoting United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187, 190 (C.C.D. Va. 
1807) (14, 694) (Marshall, C.J.)). The characterization in itself does not presuppose that all executive 
decision-making authority ultimately resides in the President. For example, President Taft, who 
appropriated the phrase for the title of one of his books, wrote that “Executive officers appointed by the 
President directly or indirectly are his subordinates, and yet Congress can undoubtedly pass laws 
definitely limiting their discretion and commanding a certain course by them which it is not within the 
power of the Executive to vary.” WILLIAM H. TAFT, OUR CHIEF MAGISTRATE AND HIS POWERS 125 
(1916). 
78.  Reply Brief, supra note 74, at 1000 (quoting Smith v. United States, 375 F.2d 243, 246–47 
(5th Cir. 1967)). 
79.  Id. (first quoting Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254, 262 (1922); and then quoting United 
States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 1965)). 
80.  Id. (quoting Cox, 342 F.2d at 193). 
81.  Id. (citing The Confiscation Cases, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 92 (1873)). 
82.  The legislation specifically authorized the President to “cause” the seizure and confiscation 
of rebels’ property. The Confiscation Cases, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) at 109. The question for the Court was 
whether this required the President personally to order a seizure or whether subordinate officials could 
do so pursuant to the President’s authority. The Court held that subordinates presumptively gave orders 
pursuant to presidential authority. Nothing in the decision presupposes that Congress was required to 
vest authority in the President or that the President would have had authority to make decisions even if 
responsibility had specifically been reposed in subordinate officers. Further, the decision has little 
bearing on the President’s criminal justice authority, since the Court specifically recognized that the 
statutory authority in issue was not a criminal-justice power, see id. at 104 (“They are in no sense 
criminal proceedings. . . .”), and that the confiscation power grew out of the state of war, id. at 109. 
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magazine article endorsing the President’s counsel’s assumption that the 
President had authority to direct criminal prosecutors.83 At around the same 
time, the DOJ’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) did so as well, in an 
opinion on whether federal officials, including the President, could be 
criminally prosecuted while in office.84 In concluding that a sitting 
President could not be prosecuted, the opinion observed that the federal 
prosecution of a sitting president would seem inconsistent with the Presi-
dent’s constitutional status as chief criminal law enforcement admini-
strator.85 The opinion observed that “the Attorney General . . . serves at the 
pleasure and [is] normally subject to the direction of the President and the 
pardoning power vested in the President” and that one could therefore 
argue “that a President’s status as defendant in a criminal case would be 
repugnant to his office of Chief Executive, which includes the power to 
oversee prosecutions.”86 The opinion cited the President’s earlier brief and 
expressly referred to the cases it cited,87 leaving the clear impression that 
the Office was not offering an objective opinion, but was putting a heavy 
thumb on the scale on the side of the sitting President’s interest and his 
personal counsel’s prior arguments.88 
In October 1973, in what came to be known as the “Saturday Night 
Massacre,” Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox resisted President Nixon’s 
instruction to withdraw the subpoena served on him. When the President 
instructed Attorney General Elliott Richardson and Deputy Attorney 
General William Ruckelshaus to fire Cox, each resigned in turn rather than 
comply. Solicitor General Robert Bork, who then became acting Attorney 
General, carried out President Nixon’s instruction.89 Bork had evidently 
concluded, contrary to Richardson and Ruckelshaus, either that the 
President had legal authority to fire Cox or that the President had legal 
 
83.  Alexander M. Bickel, The Tapes, Cox, Nixon, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 29, 1973, at 13–14. 
84.  Memorandum from Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, 
Dep’t of Justice, Re: Amenability of the President, Vice President and Other Civil Officers to Fed. 
Criminal Prosecution While in Office 26 (Sept. 24, 1973). 
85.  Id. 
86.  Id. 
87.  Id. 
88.  OLC claims to provide “advice based on its best understanding of what the law requires—not 
simply an advocate’s defense of the contemplated action or position proposed by an agency or the 
Administration.” Memorandum from David J. Barron, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal 
Counsel, Dep’t of Justice to Att’ys of the Office, Re: Best Practices for OLC Legal Advice & Written 
Opinions 1 (Jul. 16, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/olc/pdf/olc-legal-advice-opinions.pdf. OLC’s 2002 
“torture memos” prompted skepticism. See, e.g., Avidan Y. Cover, Supervisory Responsibility for the 
Office of Legal Counsel, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 269, 277–81 (2012) (describing the memos’ 
questionable reasoning). 
89.  See Carroll Kilpatrick, Nixon Forces Firing of Cox; Richardson, Ruckelshaus Quit, WASH. 
POST, Oct. 21, 1973, at A01. 
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authority to direct the Acting Attorney General to do so.90 He later 
defended his choice based on an institutional interest in preserving a 
functioning DOJ.91 
Leon Jaworski, whom Bork appointed to continue the Watergate 
investigation, followed Cox’s lead by subpoenaing President Nixon. When 
the Supreme Court heard the case in United States v. Nixon,92 the principal 
question was whether the items were protected from disclosure by execu-
tive privilege. President Nixon, however, also questioned the Special 
Prosecutor’s authority to issue the grand jury subpoena, and in that context, 
asserted the President’s authority over federal criminal law enforcement. 
His brief argued that a federal prosecutor could not issue a subpoena 
against the President’s will because the President has complete control over 
federal criminal investigations.93 The Special Prosecutor countered that his 
appointment, pursuant to an arrangement established by the Executive 
Branch, eliminated whatever authority the President might otherwise have 
had to direct this particular criminal investigation.94 However, the Special 
Prosecutor also questioned the DOJ’s assertion that the President generally 
could control the conduct of individual federal criminal cases.95 Jaworski’s 
brief pointed out that prosecutors “have duties and responsibilities owed to 
the courts,” and quoted from the Court’s opinion in Berger v. United 
States96 describing federal prosecutors’ obligation to seek justice, which, it 
argued, was incompatible with presidential direction of prosecutorial 
discretion.97 In unanimously upholding the subpoena, the Court acknow-
ledged the President’s claim to have control of all federal criminal 
 
90.  Bork later defended the lawfulness of his conduct, but it is hard to reconstruct his thinking at 
the time. There is some indication that the Justice Department thought that President Nixon had 
authority to fire Cox. See Kenneth B. Noble, Bork Irked by Emphasis on His Role in Watergate, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 2, 1987) (quoting Elliot Richardson), http://www.nytimes.com/1987/07/02/us/bork-irked-
by-emphasis-on-his-role-in-watergate.html. But there is also an indication that Bork believed the 
President had the right to fire Cox because Cox wrongfully defied the President’s direction to dismiss 
the subpoena. See Kenneth B. Noble, New Views Emerge of Bork’s Role in Watergate Dismissals, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 16, 1987) (quoting Richardson), http://www.nytimes.com/1987/07/26/us/new-views-
emerge-of-bork-s-role-in-watergate-dismissals.html?pagewanted=all. 
91.  Noble, supra note 90. 
92.  418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
93.  Brief for the Respondent, Cross-Petitioner Richard M. Nixon, President of the United States, 
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (Nos. 73-1766, 73-1834), 1974 WL 174855, at *97 
(“Since the President’s powers include control over all federal prosecutions, it is hardly reasonable or 
sensible to consider the President subject to such [federal criminal] prosecution.”). 
94.  Reply Brief for the United States, United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (Nos. 73–
1766, 73–1834), 1973 WL 159436 at *37–40 [hereinafter U.S. Reply Brief]. 
95.  Id. at *38 n.21. 
96.  295 U.S. 78 (1935). 
97.  U.S. Reply Brief, supra note 94, at *38 n.21 (quoting Berger, 295 U.S. at 88). 
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prosecutions,98 but did not endorse it. The Court found that as long as the 
regulation authorizing the Special Prosecutor to act independently was 
extant, it had the force of law.99 It did not matter that the Attorney General 
could repeal the law because he had not done so.100 The Court did not 
comment on whether, but for the delegation of authority, the President 
could have directed the prosecutor to withdraw his subpoena.101 
This unresolved debate was recalled a quarter century later in the 
context of Independent Counsel Ken Starr’s investigation of President 
Clinton.102 In 2000, the OLC reconsidered and reaffirmed its 1973 
memorandum, concluding that a sitting president could not be indicted and 
noting its earlier views regarding the President’s law-enforcement role.103 
In 1981 and 1982, in congressional hearings on whether to renew the 
special prosecutor law, Rudolph Giuliani, on behalf of the DOJ, maintained 
that the law was at odds with presidential authority to control federal 
criminal prosecutions.104 The question of presidential control of criminal 
prosecutions was posed again, albeit more vaguely, in 2007, when the 
second President Bush’s Attorney General, Alberto Gonzalez, fired several 
United States Attorneys at once, ostensibly in order to promote the 
Administration’s criminal-justice policy.105 The vagueness of the 
explanation raised questions about whether some of the prosecutors were 
fired because of their refusal to accede to the White House’s direction in 
specific cases, and this in turn led to discussion of whether the President 
had legal authority to give such direction.106 
 
98.  Nixon, 418 U.S. at 693 (noting that the President argued that he had absolute authority to 
decide what evidence can be used in a federal criminal case, and therefore the issue before the Court 
was nonjusticiable). 
99.  Id. at 695. 
100.  Id. at 694–96. 
101.  Id. at 692–97 (concluding that the Executive Branch was bound by an Attorney General 
regulation giving the Special Prosecutor authority to prosecute on behalf of the United States). 
102.  See Linda Greenhouse, The Nation; A Primer: Prosecuting the President, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 
25, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/01/25/weekinreview/the-nation-a-primer-prosecuting-a-
president.html. The issue arose during discussions of whether a sitting president could be indicted and 
prosecuted on federal charges. If the President controls the DOJ, it might seem anomalous for the DOJ 
to prosecute a sitting president. However, scholarly debate over whether a sitting president can be 
prosecuted has largely ignored this argument. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar & Brian C. Kalt, The 
Presidential Privilege Against Prosecution (1997), in FACULTY SCHOLARSHIP SERIES, Paper 940, 
http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/940/; Eric M. Freedman, On Protecting Accountability, 
27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 677 (1999). 
103.  A Sitting President’s Amenability to Indictment and Criminal Prosecution, 24 Op. O.L.C. 
222 (2000). 
104.  Tiefer, supra note 61, at 61 n.13, 92 n.162 (citing Giuliani’s congressional testimony). 
105.  See, e.g., Preserving Prosecutorial Independence: Is the Justice Department Politicizing the 
Hiring and Firing of U.S. Attorneys?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 
(2007). 
106.  See, e.g., David M. Driesen, Firing U.S. Attorneys: An Essay, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 707 
(2008) (arguing for DOJ independence based on the theory that the “take care” clause does not establish 
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Notwithstanding the DOJ’s official position, Attorney General 
nominees since Watergate have endorsed the principle of prosecutorial 
independence from the President,107 and Senators have regarded a com-
mitment to independence from the President as an essential qualification 
for the position.108 DOJ officials assume that prosecutorial decisions should 
not be influenced by partisan political considerations that may motivate the 
White House.109 Internal DOJ policy likewise presupposes that prosecutors 
should be independent. Recognizing that prosecutors “must be insulated 
from influences that should not affect decisions in particular crimi-
nal . . . cases,”110 a 2009 Attorney General memorandum narrowly 
circumscribed communications between DOJ officials and the White 
House about “pending or contemplated criminal investigations or cases.”111 
Earlier memoranda came to similar conclusions.112 But attorneys general 
have not promised that the President will be shut out of prosecutorial 
decision-making in individual criminal cases or that DOJ officials should 
risk being fired rather than follow the President’s commands. 
 
the President’s right to control subordinate executive-branch officials but only reposes a duty in the 
President). 
107.  See, e.g., Nomination of Janet Reno to Be the Attorney General of the United States: 
Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong., 47, 64–65 (1993) (Reno acknowledged 
being impressed with how a prosecution proceeded without any White House influence); Confirmation 
Hearing on William French Smith, Nominee, to Be Attorney General: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 17, 34–35 (1981) (Smith acknowledged the importance of maintaining the 
DOJ’s independence from the administration); Nomination of Edward H. Levi to Be Attorney General 
of the U.S.: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 23 (1975) (Levi: “I’m going to 
call them as I see them. I cannot imagine why anyone, including the President of the United States, 
would think of asking me to take this office, if I am confirmed, except for my independent judgment as 
to the legality, which includes frequently a judgment as to the kinds of policies which are involved in 
the legality, and I would give my independent judgment.”). 
108.  See, e.g., Confirmation Hearings on Federal Appointments—William P. Barr: Hearings 
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2 (1991) (Sen. Biden: “[W]hile working to serve the 
President, the Attorney General has the unique responsibility to the public that requires him to maintain 
independence from the President’s personal and political interests.”); see also Jack M. Beermann, The 
Never-Ending Assault on the Administrative State, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1599, 1614 (2018) 
(observing that “politically there seems to be a strong consensus rejecting [the] premise that the 
President should have control over investigations and prosecutions of executive branch officials” and 
that “[t]here is a long tradition of Justice Department independence from direct presidential 
supervision”). 
109.  This premise follows not only from principles of prosecutorial independence but also from 
the rules governing attorney conduct. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(a)(2) (AM. BAR 
ASS’N 2016); see also Green & Roiphe, supra note 9, at 484–88. 
110.  Memorandum from the U.S. Att’y Gen. Eric Holder on Commc’ns with the White House & 
Cong. 1 (May 11, 2009), https://www.justice.gov/oip/foia/library/communications_with_the_white_ 
house_and_congress_2009.pdf /download. 
111.  Id. at 2 (providing that, with the exception of criminal investigations relating to national 
security matters such as counter-terrorism and counter-espionage, initial communications “will involve 
only the Attorney General or the Deputy Attorney General” on the DOJ’s side). 
112.  See, e.g., Memorandum from U.S. Att’y Gen. Benjamin R. Civiletti on Commc’n from the 
White House & Cong. To Heads of Offices, Bds., Bureaus, & Divs. 1 (Oct. 18, 1979) (reaffirming the 
principles previously announced by Attorney General Griffin Bell). 
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D. The Constitutional Arguments Regarding Presidential Authority 
Leading up to Morrison v. Olson, several arguments were made that 
the Constitution authorizes the President to direct how federal prosecutors 
conduct criminal prosecutions. This Article has already addressed 
originalist arguments based on the early presidential history.113 This 
Subpart addresses three additional arguments that are equally unpersuasive: 
(1) the President’s executive authority, including the authority to fire the 
Attorney General, necessarily implies the power to direct how the Attorney 
General and other subordinate DOJ officials do their work; (2) the 
President’s explicit pardon power is merely illustrative and implies a 
general authority to direct how prosecutorial decisions are made; and (3) 
the nature of federal criminal prosecution necessitates presidential 
involvement. 
1. Presidential Control 
The principal arguments for presidential authority to direct decision-
making in individual criminal cases were offered in the President’s 
Watergate briefs, the OLC memoranda, and Bickel’s article: (a) criminal 
prosecution is an executive function; (b) decision-making by the Attorney 
General and subordinate DOJ officials derives from the President as chief 
executive; and (c) the power to “take care” that the criminal law is 
faithfully executed implies not only the power to fire prosecutorial officials 
who fail to carry out their responsibilities but the power to direct how they 
exercise their responsibilities. 
These arguments are unpersuasive for several reasons. Most 
importantly, the fact that the Constitution vests executive authority in the 
President and directs the President to “take care” that the law is faithfully 
executed does not invariably mean that the President has the power to 
direct subordinates’ actions. While the President ordinarily acts through 
subordinate officials,114 it does not necessarily follow that all subordinate 
officials are subject to the President’s direction.115 The DOJ itself 
recognized, in a 1937 opinion, that “when a statutory duty devolves 
primarily upon an officer other than the President, the latter’s sole 
obligation is to see that the officer performs such duty or to replace him” 
and that the President’s authority does not extend to correcting the 
 
113.  See supra Subparts I.A & I.B. 
114.  See, e.g., Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Nixon, 492 F.2d 587, 613 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (“In 
most instances, the President speaks and acts through lower governmental officials.”). 
115.  Nourse, supra note 30, at 22–24. 
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subordinates’ ostensible misjudgments.116 
To support this understanding, the 1937 opinion relied extensively on 
the lower court and Supreme Court opinions in Kendall v. United States ex 
rel. Stokes,117 involving the Postmaster General’s refusal to perform a 
ministerial act required by federal legislation—namely, to credit indivi-
duals with amounts that the Solicitor of the Treasury determined they were 
owed. In this case, the Postmaster General credited mail deliverers with 
only part of what they were found to be owed, and even when the President 
directed him to make complete payment, he declined. In reviewing the 
petitioners’ application for an order requiring full payment, the Court 
considered whether the President had authority to direct the Postmaster 
General to do his duty. The Court concluded that Congress could repose 
authority in Executive Branch officials to act independently of the 
President—that is, to answer to the law, not the President.118 The Court 
explained that the President cannot direct every executive officer: 
There are certain political duties imposed upon many officers in the exe-
cutive department, the discharge of which is under the direction of the 
President. But it would be an alarming doctrine, that congress cannot 
impose upon any executive officer any duty they may think proper, which 
is not repugnant to any rights secured and protected by the constitution; 
and in such cases, the duty and responsibility grow out of and are subject 
to the control of the law, and not to the direction of the President. And this 
is emphatically the case, where the duty enjoined is of a mere ministerial 
character.119 
The Court in Kendall made clear that executive officials must fulfill their 
duties in accordance with their understanding of the law, not the 
President’s orders. 
Kendall is not obscure, forgotten, or discredited. Although it is most 
often cited for other points, neither the Court nor Congress has questioned 
its interpretation of presidential power or otherwise repudiated the general 
principle that Congress may authorize subordinate executive officials to act 
independently of the President. On the contrary, a 1973 congressional 
opinion recognized that Kendall “suggest[s] that the President may not 
intervene to defeat the execution of statutory duties vested in other Federal 
 
116.  Presidential Auth. to Direct Dep’ts & Agencies to Withhold Expenditures from 
Appropriations Made, 1 Op. O.L.C. Supp. 12, 12–14 (1937) (first quoting The President & Accounting 
Officers, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 624, 625–26 (1823); then quoting Power of the President Respecting Pension 
Cases, 4 Op. Att’y Gen. 515, 516 (1846); and then quoting Eight-Hour Law, 19 Op. Att’y Gen. 685, 
686–87 (1890)). 
117.  Id. at 14–15 (quoting Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 610 
(1838), aff’g 26 F. Cas. 702, 752–754 (C.C.D.C. 1837) (No. 15,517)). 
118.  United States ex rel. Stokes v. Kendall, 26 F. Cas. 702, 754 (C.C.D.C. 1837) (No. 15,517). 
119.  Kendall, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) at 610. 
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officials.”120 President Nixon’s Watergate briefs, as works of advocacy, 
understandably ignored this authority, but so did the OLC’s 1973 and 2000 
memoranda in favor of an argument made by the President in a case where 
the Court ultimately ruled against him. The omission raises doubts about 
the reliability of the OLC’s understandings forged in the crucible of 
Watergate. 
One might argue about whether Kendall reflects the Framers’ original 
understanding,121 or read Kendall to apply only where subordinate execu-
tive officials perform ministerial tasks, not, as in the case of criminal 
prosecution, when they exercise discretion. But by the mid-twentieth 
century, with the rise of the administrative state, these ships had sailed: the 
idea of a unitary Executive, in which all executive power vests in the 
President, had been soundly rejected by the courts and Congress.122 
Although politicians and scholars, beginning in the 1980s, renewed the call 
for a presidency with full power over all executive function,123 they have 
not persuaded the federal Judiciary. 
The Supreme Court has rejected the idea that the President’s power to 
fire a subordinate official implies the power to specifically direct that 
official’s decision-making. While the President’s constitutional respon-
sibility to “take care” that the law is faithfully executed presupposes the 
power to hire and fire certain federal officials,124 it does not necessarily 
 
120.  Letter from U.S. Comp. Gen. Elmer B. Staats on the Legality of Exec. Impoundment of 
Appropriated Funds to Sen. Sam J. Ervin, Chairman, Subcomm. on Separation of Powers, S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, at 28 (July 26, 1973), 1974 WL 8731. 
121.  Compare, e.g., Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 60, at 663 (1994) (“[S]ince the President’s 
grant of ‘the executive Power’ is exclusive, Congress may not create other entities independent of the 
President and let them exercise his ‘executive Power.’”), with Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 59, at 41 
(“We believe that the framers wanted to constitutionalize just some of the array of power a constitution-
maker must allocate, and as for the rest, the framers intended Congress (and posterity) to control as it 
saw fit.”). 
122.  See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 59, at 97–98; id. at 106–07 (“[T]he constitutional assault 
on independent administration, at least in its broadest forms, has been decisively repudiated.”); Tiefer, 
supra note 61, at 103 (“[O]utside the areas of ‘political’ activity where officers in a strict chain of 
command carry out the President’s directions, Congress has utilized its powers to create a variety of 
bodies, some independent, some partly independent, some exercising delegated congressional 
investigative authority, and some enforcing the laws . . . .”). 
123.  The renewed call for a unitary Executive corresponds with the birth of originalism, the 
theory that the Constitution’s meaning was set when it was drafted, which justifies ignoring or 
minimizing subsequent developments. See generally LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, WHAT IS ORIGINALISM?: A 
HISTORY OF CONTEMPORARY ORIGINALIST THEORY (2011); THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM: 
THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (Grant Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011). For 
a critique of originalism, see generally EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., ORIGINALISM, FEDERALISM, AND THE 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL ENTERPRISE: A HISTORICAL INQUIRY (2007); Nourse, supra note 30; 
David A. Strauss, Foreword: Does the Constitution Mean What It Says?, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1 (2015). 
For a critique of originalism in the context of presidential control over law enforcement, see Reisman, 
supra note 17, at 56–57. 
124.  See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 922 (1997) (questioning whether 
“meaningful Presidential control is possible without the power to appoint and remove”). But see Wiener 
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follow that the President can tell those officials what to do. Chief Justice 
Taft made this point in Myers v. United States,125 striking down a statute 
denying the President power to fire the Postmaster General. Taft’s opinion 
recognized that the President can direct the conduct of some executive 
employees,126 but not necessarily all: 
[T]here may be duties so peculiarly and specifically committed to the 
discretion of a particular officer as to raise a question whether the 
President may overrule or revise the officer’s interpretation of his sta-
tutory duty in a particular instance. Then there may be duties of a quasi-
judicial character imposed on executive officers and members of exe-
cutive tribunals whose decisions after hearing affect interests of indivi-
duals, the discharge of which the President can not in a particular case 
properly influence or control.127 
These federal officials may be subject to removal by the President for 
performing their work incompetently, but not to the President’s 
direction.128 
Given the nature of criminal law enforcement, Myers suggests that 
Congress can, and almost certainly should, put prosecutors’ day-to-day 
work beyond presidential control. Decisions about whether to initiate 
investigations, whether to ask a grand jury to indict, whether to dismiss 
charges or offer a plea bargain, whether to provide immunity in exchange 
for testimony, what sentence to recommend, and the like, are all 
discretionary, not ministerial. These decisions affect individual interests—
indeed, individuals’ liberty interest. In making these decisions, prosecutors’ 
offices have been compared to administrative agencies.129 And the 
prosecutors’ work has long been described as “quasi-judicial”: in 
exercising discretion, prosecutors are expected to pursue “justice,” 
independent of partisan politics.130 
 
v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958) (upholding statute denying the President’s authority to remove a 
member of the War Claims Commission). 
125.  272 U.S. 52 (1926), overruled in part by Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 
(1935). 
126.  Id. at 135 (“The ordinary duties of officers prescribed by statute come under the general 
administrative control of the President by virtue of the general grant to him of the executive power, and 
he may properly supervise and guide their construction of the statutes under which they act in order to 
secure that unitary and uniform execution of the laws which Article II of the Constitution evidently 
contemplated in vesting general executive power in the President alone.”). 
127.  Id. 
128.  Id. 
129.  See Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2117 (1998). 
130.  See Green & Zacharias, supra note 67, at 839, 869–70. 
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2. Pardon Power 
One might argue that the presidential pardon power is not exceptional 
but was meant to illustrate the President’s ordinary power over federal 
criminal law enforcement. But even Roger Taney, a proponent of 
presidential authority over federal criminal law enforcement, declined to 
read this authority into the pardon power.131 Further, the only evidence in 
the constitutional debates is apparently to the contrary.132 If the Framers 
meant to ensure that presidents would have ultimate authority over criminal 
prosecutions, one might expect them to have given a more explicit sign, as 
they did with the war powers and other enumerated presidential powers. 
The presidential pardon power, like the executive clemency power of 
state governors, is more easily understood as distinct from the work of 
criminal prosecution. Although criminal prosecutors may decline to bring 
charges against individuals who violated the criminal law, the crux of their 
work involves determining whether the evidence establishes guilt. While a 
pardon may be issued to correct a miscarriage of justice, the traditional use 
is to render mercy—to free a guilty person from prison. A constitutional 
preference for assigning this authority to the President does not presuppose 
that the Framers meant the President to control criminal prosecution in its 
entirety. Just as plausibly, the pardon was meant as a small, exceptional 
check on prosecutors’ work.133 
Though a president can now pardon someone even before charges are 
brought, it does not follow that the President can achieve comparable 
results by directing prosecutors to refrain from bringing charges or to move 
to dismiss charges.134 The pardon power is circumscribed.135 Presidential 
influence on prosecutors’ charging decisions would not necessarily be 
evident, whereas a pardon entails a public proclamation, making the 
President accountable for his decision.136 Many believe that President Ford 
 
131.  See supra notes 53–59 and accompanying text. 
132.  See Reply Brief of Appellant Alexia Morrison at 22–23, Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 
(1987) (No. 87-1279) (“In the debates of the National Convention, of the ratifying conventions, and in 
contemporary comments, including The Federalist, we have come across no reference to the Chief 
Executive controlling the prosecutors. On the contrary, the objections to the pardon power as potentially 
shielding the guilty confederates of the President suggest that at least some of the Framers thought he 
could not accomplish the same end merely by directing the government’s attorney.”) (citing 3 YALE 
UNIV., THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 218 (Max Farrand ed., 1911)). 
133.  See Stephanie A.J. Dangel, Note, Is Prosecution a Core Executive Function? Morrison v. 
Olson and the Framers’ Intent, 99 YALE L.J. 1069, 1078–80 (1990) (“Both the colonial heritage and the 
Framers’ discussions of the pardon power show that the Founding Fathers did not intend that the 
President use his pardon power to achieve unfettered prosecutorial discretion.”). 
134.  See Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV. 671, 
698–700 (2014) (distinguishing clemency from non-enforcement). 
135.  Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 59, at 21. 
136.  See Harold J. Krent, Conditioning the President’s Conditional Pardon Power, 89 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1665, 1702 (2001). 
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lost to Jimmy Carter because of the unpopularity of his pardon of Richard 
Nixon. Likewise, one could expect political fallout if President Trump were 
to pardon campaign aides, family members, or other associates who came 
within the ambit of a federal criminal investigation. Concern about political 
consequences serves as a check on the abuse of the pardon power.137 
Limiting presidential authority in the criminal arena to public acts promotes 
accountability and curbs abuse. 
Even more obviously, the power to relieve someone of a conviction 
through a presidential pardon does not imply the power to achieve a very 
different end by directing prosecutors to initiate criminal charges. The 
Framers may not have worried about presidents abusing clemency. But, the 
harm is much greater if, out of partisanship or other improper motivations, 
presidents initiate prosecutions. Prosecuting political foes is worse than 
pardoning political allies. 
3. Necessity 
As previously described, Roger Taney considered it necessary for the 
President to be able to control criminal prosecutions because some criminal 
cases implicate foreign affairs, the war power, or other federal policy on 
which the President has ultimate constitutional authority.138 Further, as 
discussed, the early instances in which presidents intervened in individual 
criminal cases, in fact, for the most part implicated international 
considerations. Especially with the expansion of federal criminal law, few 
federal cases implicate international or military concerns. It does not follow 
that the Constitution authorizes the President to control all federal criminal 
cases because there is a plausible presidential interest in a few. 
Even when a president might legitimately take an interest, there is no 
constitutional necessity for him to make the ultimate call. The alternative is 
for the President to make his views known to the Attorney General. In a 
case involving foreign affairs, for example, the Attorney General might 
consult with the President, others in the Administration, or both, and 
consider the broader implications of a criminal case and others’ 
preferences. But the Attorney General might still have the last word to 
ensure that decision-making is consistent with criminal justice policy and 
not only with foreign or other national policy. 
Lonnie Brown has discussed an example from Lyndon Johnson’s 
administration.139 President Johnson and his cabinet pressured Attorney 
 
137.  Charles D. Berger, The Effect of Presidential Pardons on Disclosure of Information: Is Our 
Cynicism Justified?, 52 OKLA. L. REV. 163, 188 (1999) (“A President seeking reelection has a strong 
disincentive to grant pardons that would be perceived as attempts to hide information.”). 
138.  See supra notes 53–59 and accompanying text. 
139.  Brown, supra note 65. 
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General Ramsay Clark to prosecute black activists for conspiring to incite 
urban riots, based on their public addresses. Clark resisted, apparently 
believing that pursuing a prosecution would be a misuse of prosecutorial 
discretion in light of DOJ policies and traditions. It is doubtful that the 
President and the rest of the cabinet would be equally faithful to the DOJ’s 
policies and traditions. Clark’s assertion of ultimate decision-making 
responsibility ensured that, while other policy considerations would be 
weighed, criminal-justice considerations would have their due. 
The necessity argument also overlooks that the Constitution reserves 
most criminal enforcement power to the states, with the result that most 
criminal cases are, and always have been, brought in state court. State 
criminal cases, over which the President has no power, are as likely as 
federal ones to implicate foreign policy and other national policy.140 If 
presidential control is not a constitutional necessity in state criminal cases, 
there is no reason why it would be in federal cases. Finally, the necessity 
argument ignores countervailing policy considerations, addressed in Part 
III. 
E. Morrison v. Olson 
The Supreme Court decision in Morrison v. Olson141 strongly suggests 
that Congress may authorize federal prosecutors to act independently of the 
President’s direction in exercising discretion in particular cases. 
Thirty years ago, in Morrison, the Supreme Court upheld a federal 
statutory scheme that explicitly established certain federal prosecutors’ 
independence from the control of the Attorney General and the President. 
The special prosecutor provisions of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 
provided that, on application of the Attorney General, a judicial panel could 
appoint a lawyer as Special Prosecutor to investigate and prosecute federal 
crimes by certain high-ranking federal officials.142 The Independent 
Counsel had all the investigative and prosecutorial power of the DOJ and 
the Attorney General; was subject to DOJ policies wherever possible; and 
could be removed by the Attorney General only for good cause, physical 
disability, mental incapacity, or a similar condition that impaired her 
performance.143 Olson, a subject of Independent Counsel Morrison’s 
investigation, moved to quash a subpoena on the ground that the Act was 
unconstitutional. The Court rejected Olson’s constitutional challenge.144 
 
140.  See, e.g., Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 337–40 (2006) (addressing the 
admissibility of statements taken in violation of an international treaty requiring consular notification). 
141.  487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
142.  Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 591–599 (2012)). 
143.  Morrison, 487 U.S. at 660–65 (describing the independent counsel provisions). 
144.  Id. at 665–68 (describing the case’s factual background). 
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Chief Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion rejected Olson’s argument 
that all executive power, including federal prosecutorial power, “is vested 
in a unitary President required to take care that the laws are faithfully 
executed.”145 Only Justice Scalia, the lone dissenter, adopted this argu-
ment.146 The Court took it for granted that executive power is not unitary—
that officials wielding executive power could be authorized to act 
independently of presidential control.147 
The Court focused on whether limiting the President’s grounds for 
discharging independent prosecutors unduly encroached on the President’s 
power to “take care” that the law is faithfully executed. The Court relied on 
two earlier Supreme Court decisions: the 1935 decision in Humphrey’s 
Executor v. United States,148 upholding a statute that limited presidential 
power to discharge FTC commissioners to cases of inefficiency, 
malfeasance, and neglect, and the 1958 decision in Wiener v. United 
States,149 holding that the President did not have authority to fire members 
of a War Crimes Commission at will.150 The Court disagreed with Justice 
Scalia’s assertion that Congress could make executive officials independent 
from presidential control only when they performed quasi-legislative or 
quasi-judicial functions, as in the two prior cases.151 While “there are some 
‘purely executive’ officials who must be removable by the President at will 
if he is to be able to accomplish his constitutional role,” said the Court, 
independent prosecutors are not among them because they have “limited 
 
145.  Brief of Appellee Theodore B. Olson, Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (No. 87-
1279), 1988 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 983, at *37. This was also the Government’s primary argument 
as amicus curiae. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees, Morrison v. 
Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (No. 82-1279), 1988 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 980, at *16–34. 
146.  Morrison, 487 U.S. at 705–10 (Scalia, J., dissenting). For a critique of Justice Scalia’s 
reasoning, see Nourse, supra note 30, at 23 (arguing that Justice Scalia “enriches” the text by reading 
the word “all” into executive power). 
147.  As the Senate’s amicus brief in Morrison pointed out, since Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 
Cranch) 137 (1803), the Court has recognized Congress’s power to establish Executive Branch officers 
who answer to the law, not the President, because their duties are not political and implicate individual 
rights. Brief of U.S. Senate as Amicus Curiae, Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (No. 82-1279), 
1988 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 982, at *27–28 (first citing Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 166; and then 
citing Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 610 (1838)); see also Marbury, 5 
U.S. (1 Cranch) at 166 (“[W]hen the legislature proceeds to impose on that officer other duties; when he 
is directed peremptorily to perform certain acts; when the rights of individuals are dependent on the 
performance of those acts; he is so far the officer of the law.”); Kendall, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) at 610 
(rejecting the premise “that every [Executive Branch] officer. . . is under the exclusive direction of the 
President,” and observing that Congress may assign executive duties that “grow out of and are subject 
to the control of the law, and not to the direction of the President.”). 
148.  295 U.S. 602 (1935). 
149.  357 U.S. 349 (1958). 
150.  Id. at 356. 
151.  Morrison, 487 U.S. at 687–93. 
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jurisdiction and tenure and lack[] policymaking or significant admini-
strative authority.”152 
The Court acknowledged that an independent counsel “exercises no 
small amount of discretion and judgment in deciding how to carry out his 
or her duties under the Act,” but did not regard “the President’s need to 
control the exercise of that discretion [as being] so central to the 
functioning of the Executive Branch as to require as a matter of consti-
tutional law that the counsel be terminable at will by the President.”153 
Presidential responsibility to ensure that the Independent Counsel per-
formed competently was sufficiently exercised through the indirect power 
(through the Attorney General) to fire the Independent Counsel for 
cause.154 In other words, Article II power does not imply the power to 
terminate all subordinate officers, much less to direct their conduct. 
Subordinate executive officials—except for those in “policymaking or 
significant administrative authority”155—may be given independence from 
presidential direction and control as long as the President retains direct or 
indirect authority to fire them for good reasons, such as incompetence or 
malfeasance. 
Further, the Court found that the independent counsel provisions did 
not violate separation-of-powers principles as a whole by encroaching on 
presidential authority.156 The Court emphasized that the law did not remove 
significant power from the Executive to Congress or to the Judiciary, which 
could not control the independent counsel’s work.157 Congress simply 
moved power from one place in the Executive Branch to another.158 
Finally, the Court dismissed an argument, most fully elaborated in an 
amicus brief on behalf of three former Attorneys General,159 that the statute 
isolated the Independent Counsel from the Executive Branch, and parti-
cularly from the DOJ, with its institutional wisdom, experience, traditions, 
and other checks. The Court observed that the Independent Counsel was 
appointed only upon application by the Attorney General, was subject to 
discharge for cause by the Attorney General, and was obligated to follow 
 
152.  Id. at 690–91. 
153.  Id. at 691. 
154.  Id. at 692, 695–96. 
155.  Id. at 691. 
156.  Id. at 693–95. 
157.  Id. at 693–97. 
158.  Id. at 694–95. 
159.  Brief for Edward H. Levi, Griffin B. Bell, & William French Smith as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Appellees, Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (No. 87-1279), 1988 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs 
LEXIS 981, at *28–32. The brief suggested other “ways to protect the independence of a criminal 
investigation from political interference,” such as by establishing a special prosecutor with a fixed term 
covering different presidential administrations. Id. at *42. 
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DOJ policy where possible,160 and it concluded that “these features of the 
Act give the Executive Branch sufficient control over the independent 
counsel to ensure that the President is able to perform his constitutionally 
assigned duties.”161 
Along the way, the Court rejected Justice Scalia’s assumption that 
federal prosecution by its nature was not just an executive power but also a 
presidential power.162 Justice Scalia wrote that “[a]lmost all investigative 
and prosecutorial decisions—including the ultimate decision whether, after 
a technical violation of the law has been found, prosecution is warranted—
involve the balancing of innumerable legal and practical considerations,” 
and gave as examples situations involving subpoenaing a former ambas-
sador and whether to use classified information in a prosecution.163 He 
concluded that “the balancing of various legal, practical, and political 
considerations, none of which is absolute, is the very essence of prose-
cutorial discretion,” and that “[t]o take this away is to remove the core of 
the prosecutorial function, and not merely ‘some’ presidential control.”164 
The Court did not dispute Justice Scalia’s description of prosecutorial 
decision-making, but nevertheless considered it inessential for the President 
to be the ultimate arbiter, even on occasions when nonpartisan political 
considerations and foreign policy considerations were implicated. The 
Court was satisfied that Congress could delegate this type of executive 
decision-making to court-appointed lawyers governed by DOJ policy and 
subject to termination for incompetence. 
Morrison strongly suggests that Congress can make any or all federal 
prosecutors independent from presidential direction.165 The Court did not 
consider federal prosecutorial decision-making a core presidential function, 
 
160.  Morrison, 487 U.S. at 696. A century earlier, United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483 (1886), 
established Congress’s authority to limit the grounds on which the President may discharge certain 
subordinate officials. 
161.  Morrison, 487 U.S. at 696. 
162.  See id. 
163.  Id. at 707–708 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
164.  Id. at 707–08. 
165.  See, e.g., Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 59, at 110 (“[A]fter Morrison v. Olson, execution 
of the laws can be split off from the President if the splitting does not prevent the President from 
performing his ‘constitutionally appointed functions.’” (quoting Morrison, 487 U.S. at 685)). An earlier 
example was the establishment of a Special Prosecutor to investigate the Teapot Dome scandal. Act of 
Feb. 8, 1924, ch. 16, 43 Stat. 5, 5–6 (1924). In recent years, many scholars have been sympathetic to 
Justice Scalia’s dissent in Morrison. See, e.g., Counsels and the Separation of Powers, Hearing Before 
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 5 (2017) (statement of Akhil Reed Amar), https://www.jud 
iciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/09-26-17%20Amar%20Testimony.pdf (asserting that “[t]he lion’s 
share of the constitutional law scholars who are most expert and most surefooted on this particular topic 
now believe that Morrison was wrongly decided and/or that the case is no longer ‘good law’ that can be 
relied upon as a sturdy guidepost to what the current Court would and should do”). But many others are 
less so, and the fact remains that, whatever individual Justices may have said before being confirmed, 
the Supreme Court itself has not given any indication that it would reexamine Morrison or that the 
Court’s decision in Morrison is not good law. 
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one that Congress cannot place elsewhere in the Executive Branch—and 
little wonder, since modern presidents rarely seek to assert this power, and 
as we discuss below, the tradition of prosecutorial independence has grown 
into a permanent feature of American government. Given that under-
standing, Congress could presumably create a corps of federal prosecutors 
hired and subject to firing by the Attorney General, but not otherwise 
subject to the Attorney General’s direction or the centralized control of the 
DOJ or, indirectly, the President. Nothing in Morrison suggests why 
Congress could not just as legitimately establish independent counsel to 
investigate and prosecute crimes other than those by high-ranking federal 
officials. 
The harder question is whether Congress has in fact required or 
authorized federal prosecutors to ignore presidential direction and, if not, 
whether that expectation has some other legal basis. Or, put differently, the 
question is whether the law regulating federal prosecutorial decision-
making presupposes that prosecutors will not defer to third parties’ 
direction, not even to that of the President. In past confirmation hearings, 
some senators and attorney general nominees seemingly assumed that the 
Attorney General may not defer to the President in individual criminal 
cases, but the source of that assumption is unclear. 
Morrison involved a statute that explicitly removed the Independent 
Counsel from the direction of the President or the Attorney General. The 
statutory scheme establishing the Attorney General, the DOJ, United States 
Attorneys, and subordinate federal prosecutors is quite different. It does not 
expressly authorize or require the Attorney General or lower-ranked 
prosecutors to make decisions independently of the President. That the 
Attorney General serves at the will of the President might be taken to mean 
that the Attorney General must follow the President’s lawful directions not 
only as to certain matters, such as those involving broad policy, but as to all 
matters, including the conduct of individual criminal prosecutions and 
investigations and civil lawsuits. That United States Attorneys serve at the 
will of the Attorney General, and lower ranked federal prosecutors serve 
subject to supervision of United States Attorneys or higher ranked DOJ 
officials, might imply that they must follow all lawful directions of the 
Attorney General, including those originating with the President. 
On the other hand, requiring the Attorney General to ignore presi-
dential directions regarding specific criminal cases, and to insulate lower-
level prosecutors from presidential influence in such cases, would be a 
modest delegation of executive power as compared with the independent 
counsel provisions that the Court upheld. Prosecutions would remain under 
DOJ control, unlike those conducted by independent counsel, pursuant to 
the Ethics in Government Act. And, prosecutorial independence from the 
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President would largely accord with contemporary practice and expecta-
tions. 
The Morrison Court had no reason to determine how prosecutorial 
power is allocated within the Executive Branch as a general matter. Any 
hints Morrison may have dropped are of little significance thirty years 
later, given that none of the Justices who decided Morrison are still active 
members of the Court.166 And, while Congress ultimately allowed the inde-
pendent counsel provisions to sunset, that was not an endorsement of 
Justice Scalia’s dissenting view that the President should have the last word 
on criminal prosecutions generally, much less in cases involving Executive 
Branch officials. At most, it reflected confidence that career prosecutors or 
special prosecutors appointed by the DOJ could perform this work as 
independently as court-appointed counsel. 
F. Concluding Thoughts 
There is a scholarly debate over the extent of presidential authority in 
the administrative state: which non-enumerated powers must, as a constitu-
tional matter, remain within the President’s control and which may be 
allocated to lesser officials, subject only to presidential oversight and 
dismissal power.167 This Article does not enter that debate as a general 
matter, but focuses on the specific question of whether federal criminal 
prosecution is vested in the President. After Morrison, we think it is hard to 
argue that the Constitution necessarily assigns criminal law enforcement 
authority to the President. Although prosecution is an executive power, 
Congress may delegate certain executive powers to federal officers who act 
independently of the President—who, although subject to termination by 
the President or the Attorney General, are required to make legal decisions 
on their own. As the independent counsel provisions illustrated, prosecutors 
may be asked to answer to the law, not the President. 
The difficult question is the statutory one—whether Congress has 
authorized the President to direct federal prosecutions or, alternatively, has 
authorized the Attorney General and subordinate federal prosecutors to do 
so independently of the President.168 The question, which was largely 
academic from the Ford through Obama administrations, is critical now 
 
166.  Justice Kennedy, having recently joined the Court, did not participate in the decision. 
167.  See, e.g., Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 
U. CHI. L. REV. 123 (1994); Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 59. 
168.  See Norman W. Spaulding, Professional Independence in the Office of the Attorney 
General, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1931, 1968–69 (2008) (inquiring, given that “centralized control and 
political influence were equally significant factors” in attorneys generals’ failings, “What then are we to 
make of the fact that no major structural guarantees of independence have been implemented in the 
office of the Attorney General?”). 
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because of reports that the current President has attempted, or at least might 
attempt, to direct the Attorney General to bring charges against a political 
foe or to drop an investigation or charge against a political ally or personal 
associate.169 Should this occur, the Attorney General or a subordinate 
prosecutor would have to decide whether there is a legal obligation to 
comply or, alternatively, to exercise prosecutorial discretion without regard 
to presidential direction. A federal court might conceivably confront the 
question if, for example, a subordinate prosecutor challenges adverse 
employment action for disobeying a presidential directive, or a defendant 
moves to dismiss criminal charges brought in obedience to a presidential 
directive. A federal court might also determine how prosecutorial authority 
is allocated within the federal Executive Branch in the course of resolving 
another legal question, such as whether presidential interference in a 
criminal case might comprise obstruction of justice, or whether a sitting 
president can be indicted. 
The statutory-interpretation question essentially has two parts—
whether the Attorney General can direct the conduct of subordinate 
prosecutors, and if so, whether the President can dictate how the Attorney 
General conducts criminal prosecutions or directs subordinate prosecutors. 
The relevant legislation provides no explicit answer to the second part of 
the question. 
As to the first part, federal law reserves the conduct of litigation, 
including criminal prosecutions, to “officers of the Department of Justice, 
under the direction of the Attorney General,” except where the law 
provides otherwise.170 This is conventionally taken to mean that United 
States Attorneys and other subordinate DOJ lawyers are, in theory, subject 
to the Attorney General’s specific direction,171 although, as a practical 
matter, subordinate prosecutors maintain substantial autonomy: it would be 
a rare criminal case where, consistent with DOJ policy, an attorney general 
made the ultimate decision. It should be noted, however, that the current 
regime of attorney general control, sparingly exercised, was not always the 
understanding, and owes something to historic practice. The Judiciary Act 
of 1789 gave the Attorney General no control or direction over federal 
prosecutors.172 Federal prosecutors (then “district attorneys”) were first 
 
169.  See supra notes 4–5. 
170.  28 U.S.C. § 516 (2012); see also supra note 38 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 516). Section 519 
provides: “Except as otherwise authorized by law, the Attorney General shall supervise all litigation to 
which the United States, an agency, or officer thereof is a party, and shall direct all United States 
attorneys, assistant United States attorneys, and special attorneys . . . in the discharge of their respective 
duties.” Id. § 519. 
171.  See United States v. Wrigley, 520 F.2d 362, 368 (8th Cir. 1975). 
172.  The Act provided that “there shall be appointed in each district a meet person learned in the 
law to act as attorney for the United States in such district, who shall be sworn or affirmed to the 
faithful execution of his office, whose duty it shall be to prosecute in such district all delinquents for 
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placed expressly under the Attorney General’s oversight in 1861.173 This 
might have been read to mean simply that the Attorney General had 
authority to hire and fire and to prescribe general policy, and the uncer-
tainty was exacerbated by later legislation, including an act “requiring the 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue to establish regulations for the guidance 
of United States attorneys.”174 In 1869, the Supreme Court simply assumed 
that district attorneys were subject to the Attorney General’s “superinten-
dence and direction,” whether as a matter of “the usage of the govern-
ment,” federal legislation, or the Court’s own decisions.175 The 1870 legi-
slation creating the DOJ, while making it clear that the Attorney General 
headed the agency, was also not explicit that prosecutors were intended to 
answer to the Attorney General,176 and the legislative history is ambi-
guous.177 Internal DOJ guidance takes the view that the Attorney General 
possesses plenary authority over subordinates, which is “rooted historically 
in our common law and tradition,” 178 though based in legislation since 
1870.179 The legislation itself is less clear than the DOJ’s guidance sug-
gests. 
 
crimes and offences, cognizable under the authority of the United States,” and that “there shall also be 
appointed a meet person, learned in the law, to act as attorney-general for the United States, who shall 
be sworn or affirmed to a faithful execution of his office; whose duty it shall be to prosecute and 
conduct all suits in the Supreme Court in which the United States shall be concerned, and to give his 
advice and opinion upon questions of law when required by the President of the United States, or when 
requested by the heads of any of the departments, touching any matters that may concern their 
departments.” The Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92–93. 
173.  Act of Aug. 2, 1861, ch. 37, § 1, 12 Stat. 285, 285; see Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. (7 
Wall.) 454, 457 (1868). 
174.  Sewall Key, The Legal Work of the Federal Government, 25 VA. L. REV. 165, 180–81 
(1938) (citing Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 169, § 3, 14 Stat. 471); accord Griffin B. Bell, The Attorney 
General: The Federal Government’s Chief Lawyer and Chief Litigator, or One Among Many?, 46 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1049, 1054 (1978) (“Congress was exhibiting a curious ambivalence about the role 
of the Attorney General and the Department of Justice . . . .”). 
175.  Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 458–59. 
176.  Act of June 22, 1870, ch. 150, 16 Stat. 162. The 1870 legislation creating the DOJ 
authorized the Attorney General to appoint special assistants to conduct litigation that district attorneys 
could not conduct, but the law did not specifically authorize the Attorney General to direct the district 
attorneys’ work. Id.  
177.  Compare Key, supra note 174, at 182 & n.66 (citing legislative statements suggesting the 
Attorney General was meant to control federal prosecutors), with Bell, supra note 174, at 1054 (citing 
contemporaneous legislation showing that “Congress . . . had not been serious about centralizing all 
legal activity under the Attorney General”). At least with respect to the federal government’s civil 
litigation, United States v. San Jacinto Tin Co., 125 U.S. 273 (1888), has been taken to establish the 
centralization of authority in the Attorney General. Key, supra note 174, at 186–87. 
178.  The Att’y Gen.’s Role as Chief Litigator for the U.S., 6 Op. O.L.C. 47, 48 (1982) (first 
citing Confiscation Cases, 7 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 458–59; and then citing The Gray Jacket, 72 U.S. (5 
Wall.) 370 (1866)). 
179.  Id. (“Such authority . . . , since 1870, has been given a statutory basis.”) (citing 5 U.S.C. 
§ 3106 (2012) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 516, 519 (2012)). For a discussion of how decision-making should be 
allocated in the DOJ between the Attorney General, United States attorneys, and subordinate 
prosecutors, see Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, “The U.S. Attorneys Scandal” and the Allocation 
of Prosecutorial Power, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 187 (2008). 
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If the division of authority between the Attorney General and 
subordinate DOJ lawyers is relatively settled, particularly to the satisfaction 
of the DOJ and its lawyers, the division of authority between the President 
and the Attorney General with regard to criminal prosecutions is not. The 
law is silent. On one hand, legislation does not explicitly make the 
Attorney General and the DOJ independent of the President, as it has done 
with some other executive agencies and officials.180 As a cabinet officer 
and presidential advisor, the Attorney General plainly answers to the 
President as to certain matters, and one might assume that absent an 
express limitation on presidential power, the President may control the 
Attorney General as to all matters. On the other hand, federal legislation 
has never explicitly authorized the President to make decisions in criminal 
investigations and prosecutions or to direct the decisions of the Attorney 
General, United States Attorneys, or other prosecutors. Statutes leave it 
uncertain whether there is a particular aspect of the Attorney General’s 
work—criminal investigation and prosecution—as to which the Attorney 
General, and through him, subordinate government lawyers, have ultimate 
decision-making authority and must answer to the law, not the President. 
In situations such as this one, where legislation is silent, courts look to 
Congress’s implicit intent. Implicit legislative intent regarding the division 
or allocation of power may be reflected not only in the structure and 
purpose of legislation but in conduct, and attendant understandings, over 
time—in other words, historical practice. Just as historical practice plays a 
role in constitutional interpretation,181 courses of conduct and under-
standings developed over time help answer statutory interpretation 
questions about the scope of presidential power.182 Congressional silence in 
response to sustained or repeated conduct may express congressional 
acquiescence in the exercise of authority.183 In particular, implied under-
 
180.  See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 153 (2012) (“There shall be a General Counsel of the [National Labor 
Relations] Board who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the 
Senate, for a term of four years. The General Counsel . . . shall have final authority, on behalf of the 
Board, in respect of the investigation of charges and issuance of complaints . . ., and in respect of the 
prosecution of such complaints before the Board. . . .”). 
181.  See, e.g., NLRB v. Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2559–60 (2014) (“[I]n interpreting the 
[Recess Appointments] Clause, we put significant weight upon historical practice.” (emphasis 
omitted)); The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 689 (1929) (“Long settled and established practice is a 
consideration of great weight in a proper interpretation of constitutional provisions.”). 
182.  See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“Deeply embedded traditional ways of conducting government cannot 
supplant the Constitution or legislation, but they give meaning to the words of a text or supply them.”), 
quoted in Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 400–01 (1989). While Youngstown addressed 
presidential power vis-à-vis Congress, the principle of interpretation applies equally to presidential 
power vis-à-vis executive agencies and officials. 
183.  See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 678–79 (1981) (perceiving “a history of 
congressional acquiescence in conduct of the sort engaged in by the President”); id. at 686; United 
States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 474–75 (1914) (inferring congressional intent from “long-
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standings reflected in a course of conduct may inform questions about the 
allocation of authority within the Executive Branch itself. As noted, the 
Supreme Court’s earliest understanding regarding the allocation of power 
between the Attorney General and district attorneys was not derived from 
statutory language but from the course of dealings within the Executive 
Branch.184 
The next part of this Article shows that prosecutorial independence is 
so clearly a part of our democratic system that Congress’s failure to 
authorize presidential control shows acquiescence or implicit endorsement. 
While the concept of congressional acquiescence has been challenged when 
it comes to questions about the allocation of power between Congress and 
the President,185 the concept should be far less controversial with regard to 
the division of authority within the Executive Branch. Congress meant for 
someone within the Executive Branch to have the last word on the conduct 
of criminal cases—either the President or the Attorney General. If the law 
is uncertain, there is no reason to presume which should possess this 
authority. Congressional intent must be sought wherever it can be found. 
Whether or not historic practice is dispositive, it can surely weigh heavily 
in the balance. Because the Constitution, while providing pardon power, 
does not otherwise authorize the President to act in criminal cases, the 
President’s authority would be “at its lowest ebb” in the criminal context 
unless, in a particular case, one could argue that an enumerated presidential 
power was implicated.186 
II. HISTORY OF PROSECUTORIAL INDEPENDENCE 
A. Overview 
We turn to history at the invitation of Supreme Court cases as a means 
to assess congressional intent.187 Even absent such an invitation, history is 
critical in understanding the meaning of contemporary law and the 
structure of democratic institutions. History is often contradictory. If done 
 
continued practice, known to and acquiesced in by Congress”). See generally Shalev Roisman, 
Constitutional Acquiescence, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 668 (2016). 
184.  See supra notes 175–79 and accompanying text. 
185.  See, e.g., Matthew Baker, The Sound of Congressional Silence: Judicial Distortion of the 
Legislative-Executive Balance of Power, 2009 B.Y.U. L. REV. 225, 229–30 (2009) (citing skeptical 
scholarship and Justices); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 
67 (1988); John C. Grabow, Congressional Silence and the Search for Legislative Intent: A Venture into 
“Speculative Unrealities,” 64 B.U. L. REV. 737 (1984). 
186.  Cf. Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“When the President takes 
measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, 
for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers . . . .”). 
187.  See supra notes 181–84 and accompanying text. 
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well, it can confuse rather than simplify.188 While even originalists 
acknowledge the shortcomings of historical analysis, they argue that the 
intent of the Founders ought to govern our interpretation of the Consti-
tution. Judges ought to be constrained in how they read the law, and 
originalism, albeit imperfect, prevents them from drawing on their own 
ideological or idiosyncratic views.189 
This Part turns to history for a different, competing reason. The law 
changes as society evolves, and if we don’t understand how and why, we 
will be at a distinct disadvantage in untangling its present meaning. This 
Part is designed to track the development of a concept, how it changed in 
both meaning and purpose. Given the importance of balance of power in 
our democracy, it is critical that we recognize how the system and structure 
of government have changed to adapt to new circumstances while keeping 
those core values intact. Once these subtle changes in government structure 
become clearer, we can recognize and preserve this balance. 
The relationship between the President and the DOJ, the Attorney 
General, and the United States Attorneys is not static. As the federal 
criminal justice system expanded, the pieces of that system evolved and 
shifted in relation to each other. Punctuated by scandals and moments of 
rapid growth, federal law enforcement changed from the job of a single 
part-time employee to a massive organization with multiple departments, 
over 10,000 lawyers, and myriad responsibilities. 
This Part does not describe linear progress or consensus, but rather 
points to one theme that has developed consistently as the organ of law 
enforcement expanded and consolidated under the Executive Department. 
Just as expertise formed the cornerstone of the administrative state, so too 
professional independence became the defining characteristic of the DOJ. 
Professional independence does not have a fixed meaning. It grew to 
denote a distance from both the changing tide of popular opinion and the 
ambitions of partisan politics. In the wake of the Watergate scandal, the 
debate over how to foster and ensure independence culminated in the 
explicit articulation of the separation of the DOJ from presidential con-
trol.190 
Throughout the twentieth century, the professional identity of the 
lawyers in the DOJ grew increasingly important in defining the mission of 
 
188.  The postmodern critique of history undermined the integrity of the discipline by arguing 
that the past is in the eye of the beholder. The inquiry is necessarily determined by the biases and 
beliefs of each historian. See generally JOYCE APPLEBY ET AL., TELLING THE TRUTH ABOUT HISTORY 
(1994) (summarizing this literature). In the wake of this critique, others have acknowledged the 
impossibility of objectivity, but have argued that history is critical nonetheless. PETER NOVICK, THAT 
NOBLE DREAM: THE “OBJECTIVITY QUESTION” AND THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL PROFESSION (1988). 
189.  For a critique of originalism and textualism, see Nourse, supra note 30, at 101–07. 
190.  For a different interpretation of the evolving definition of prosecutorial independence, see 
Spaulding, supra note 168. 
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the office and its relationship to the Executive Branch. Legislators, courts, 
and DOJ lawyers pointed to professional norms as the key to determining 
the role of the Attorney General and federal prosecutors, and their 
interactions with the President. The balance of powers in the Constitution 
was designed to protect individual liberty and the rule of law. As the nature 
of government changed, the meaning and importance of prosecutorial 
independence evolved to preserve these central values. 
As prosecutorial independence grew more central to the structure of 
American criminal justice, its meaning shifted. Prosecutorial independence 
in its older iteration rested on the distinction between law and politics. In 
earlier understanding, the meaning was relatively unproblematic. The 
Attorney General was independent from the President because of his 
allegiance to the law, a clearly discernible body of edicts separate from 
political inclination. In other words, critics assumed that the Attorney 
General applied the law in a disinterested way. His discretion was limited, 
not by political accountability, but by the determinate meaning of the law 
he enforced. Independence, in this context, came with the job. By reading 
the law accurately, the Attorney General was doing something different 
from politicians, and as long as he did it well, he would necessarily be 
independent from them. 
In the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, however, the 
distinction between law and politics began to collapse. Legal realists 
argued that law was not a clearly discernible set of rules that yielded a 
discrete answer when applied to different sets of facts. Instead, they 
reduced law to the choices those in power make, choices that are clearly 
formed by moral and ideological beliefs. As jurists and critics began to 
accept this critique of the distinction between law and politics, prosecu-
torial independence grew more precarious. It had to rest on either a distinct 
legal approach to solving problems or the personal integrity of the lawyer. 
As the latter two definitions prevailed, the isolation of DOJ lawyers grew 
increasingly important both to preserve their personal character from 
corruption and to hone their distinct skills and craft. 
B. The Attorney General in the Beginning 
As discussed above, the significance of early federal criminal practice 
is mixed.191 To frame the history of prosecutorial independence, it is 
 
191.  See supra Subpart I.B. These scholars use originalism as an approach to statutory or 
constitutional interpretation. In other words, they purport to use history to ascertain the meaning of law 
at a particular time, assuming that the contemporary understanding ought to reflect that original public 
meaning. For a critique of the way many academics have used history to support their ideological 
commitments in legal scholarship, see Martin S. Flaherty, History “Lite” in Modern American 
Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 523, 523–29 (1995). 
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important to understand that the notion of prosecutorial independence 
animated early criminal practice as it does today. Federal criminal prosecu-
tions were rare, and responsibility for enforcing laws was dispersed largely 
among local actors. Prosecutorial independence was a function of this 
reality as much as it was a product of theoretical commitment. 
When Congress created the office of the Attorney General in 1789,192 
the office was weak, perhaps intentionally so.193 Underfunded and poorly 
staffed, the Attorney General lacked office space and supplies. The salary 
was low relative to other offices created by the First Congress, and it soon 
became clear that it was only a part-time job.194 Lawyers were expected to 
continue in private practice, and the remuneration was, in part, the prestige 
that would come from the post.195 Other than representing the government 
in the Supreme Court and giving opinions on the law, the duties were 
vague. The Judiciary Act perpetuated a system of district attorneys, 
“learned in the law,” who would prosecute “all delinquents for crimes and 
offenses, cognizable under the authority of the United States, and all civil 
actions in which the United States shall be concerned” but gave the 
Attorney General no supervisory power over these prosecutors, who 
worked in the lower courts throughout the country.196 
Original drafts of the Judiciary Act, which empowered district courts to 
appoint local prosecutors and the Supreme Court to select the Attorney 
General, suggest that prosecutors were viewed, at least by some, as judicial 
officers, clearly immune from presidential control.197 Sensitive to the 
debate over the power of the federal government, the final draft of the 
 
192.  The Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92–93. The office of the Attorney 
General was modeled in part on the English predecessor but the colonies had created attorneys general 
as well. LUTHER A. HUSTON, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 6 (Ernest S. Griffith & Hugh Langdon 
Elsbree eds., 1967). 
193.  Legislators in the First Congress were reluctant to create a strong wing of federal law 
enforcement, fearful of the cost of centralization to liberty. HUSTON, supra note 192, at 4–5. The Act 
itself was a compromise, designed to unite those in favor of strong federal government and those fearful 
of its potential dangers. 1 JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES 458 (Paul A. Freund ed., 1971); Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal 
Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49, 109 (1923). 
194.  CORNELL W. CLAYTON, THE POLITICS OF JUSTICE: THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND THE 
MAKING OF LEGAL POLICY 16–17 (Routledge 2015) (1992); The position did not become full-time until 
1853 when Caleb Cushing assumed the post and pushed for greater support. HUSTON, supra note 192, 
at 9–11. 
195.  President Washington informed his Attorney General, Edmund Randolph, that the position 
would “confer pre-eminence” which would serve as an advantage in his private practice. Luther A. 
Huston, History of the Office of the Attorney General, in ROLES OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE 
UNITED STATES 6 (1968). 
196.  Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, 92–93. The district attorneys did not answer 
directly to anyone until 1830, at which point Congress put the Secretary of Treasury in charge of their 
operations. It wasn’t until 1861 that district attorneys officially reported to the Attorney General. 
197.  NANCY V. BAKER, CONFLICTING LOYALTIES: LAW AND POLITICS IN THE ATTORNEY 
GENERAL’S OFFICE, 1789–1990, at 46–47 (1992); Warren, supra note 193, at 109. 
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statute was silent on the matter.198 Despite the fear of a strong federal 
government, the President quickly assumed the task of appointing the 
Attorney General, asking the Senate for advice and consent, which soon 
became the norm.199 The President’s ability to appoint the Attorney General 
was not mandated by the law or Constitution but rather a matter of practice. 
The trappings of the Attorney General’s post were slim and the tasks 
poorly defined. The first attorneys general occupied themselves mostly by 
giving opinions on the law, because federal criminal law was sparse and 
there were few cases in the Supreme Court in the early years. The statute 
was silent about the relationship between the Attorney General and the 
Legislature, but attorneys general regularly responded to Congress’s 
request for opinions on the legality of proposed legislation. In practice, in 
the early years, the Attorney General occupied a position in between all 
three branches of government. 
The legislative history of the Judiciary Act and early practice can 
support either strong presidential control or a more diffuse notion of prose-
cution.200 This ambiguity is unsurprising given the fact that the Judiciary 
Act itself was a compromise, designed to unite those in favor of strong 
federal government and those fearful of its potential dangers.201 
The nature of criminal law enforcement in the new republic, which 
mostly occurred at the local level, made it difficult, if not impossible, for 
the President to exert power even if he were so inclined. Oddly, states and 
private citizens were just as likely to institute proceedings against an 
individual for federal criminal offenses as federal prosecutors, which made 
it even harder for the President to exert his influence.202 The law and reality 
of federal prosecution meant that district attorneys were largely autono-
mous.203 
Federal criminal law at the time was far less expansive than it is now. 
Many doubted and resisted the federal government’s power to prosecute 
crimes at all.204 The isolated acts of early presidents notwithstanding, the 
Executive did not exercise centralized control over criminal justice.205 
Federal prosecutions tended to implicate other core executive functions 
because the federal criminal law itself was confined to only a few offenses 
 
198.  Warren, supra note 193, at 107–09. For a discussion of how problematic originalism is, in 
part due to the contradictory impulses and complex compromises that led to the provisions of the 
Constitution, see PURCELL, JR., supra note 123, at 3–17. 
199.  HOMER CUMMINGS & CARL MCFARLAND, FEDERAL JUSTICE 17–18 (1937); Bloch, supra 
note 44, at 568. 
200.  See supra Subpart I.B. 
201.  GOEBEL, supra note 193, at 458 (1971); Warren, supra note 193, at 107–09. 
202.  Krent, supra note 136, at 304–07; Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 59, at 19–20. 
203.  Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 59, at 16. 
204.  ELIZABETH DALE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES, 1789–1938, at 17 (2011). 
205.  Id. at 20. 
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with strong implications for national interests. Most of the prosecutions in 
which presidents chose to interfere involved interests that were even more 
fundamental to the new nation than most federal criminal proceedings.206 
This is not to say that there is no evidence of the early concept of executive 
control over prosecutorial decisions but rather that such control is far less 
remarkable than it would be today. Interfering in these particular cases was 
a way of ensuring policy objectives in areas of central national concern. 
The ambiguity in the Judiciary Act may have appeased concerns about 
a strong federal Judiciary and law enforcement power. The narrow scope 
and infrequent application of federal criminal law most likely made 
presidents’ interference seem less of a threat to the principles of Anti-
Federalists. 
In the first decades of the new republic, individuals could be prose-
cuted under federal common law as well as statutory edicts. It was not until 
1812 that the Court put an end to this practice, holding that individuals 
could not be federally prosecuted unless Congress had declared their 
conduct criminal.207 The controversy over the federal common law of 
crimes shows how contested federal criminal prosecutions were. The 
Court’s decision in 1812 demonstrated a growing willingness and desire to 
limit the executive power over criminal law enforcement by eliminating 
this entire set of unwritten criminal offenses.208 Unlike in England, written 
law rather than traditions would define the scope of government power. In 
this context, the idea that federal executive control over prosecution was 
settled is a bit nonsensical. The nature of prosecution, along with the power 
of the federal government to convict individuals of crimes against the 
sovereignty, was itself in dispute. If anything, in 1812, the vision of limited 
federal control over prosecution prevailed. 
The failure of the Treasury in collecting debts after the War of 1812 led 
President Jackson to propose greater central control over federal criminal 
law enforcement.209 Daniel Webster led the charge against the bill, arguing 
that it would create a monster: “A half accountant, a half lawyer, a half 
clerk—in fine, a half of every thing, and not much of any thing.”210 In 
essence, Webster worried that the Attorney General’s professional status 
 
206.  CUMMINGS & MCFARLAND, supra note 199, at 143. 
207.  Gary D. Rowe, The Sound of Silence: United States v. Hudson & Godwin, The Jeffersonian 
Ascendency, and the Abolition of Federal Common Law Crimes, 101 YALE L.J. 919, 919–21 (1992). 
For a general discussion of the debate over federal common law of crimes, see G. EDWARD WHITE, 1 
LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 230–32 (2012). 
208.  Rowe, supra note 207, at 922. In 1837, the Supreme Court again expressed concern about 
federal criminal law enforcement power, suggesting that general police powers belonged to the states. 
See City of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. 102, 133 (1837). 
209.  CUMMINGS & MCFARLAND, supra note 199, at 144–45. A resolution proposing similar 
control over federal law enforcement had been introduced in 1819 but did not pass. Id. 
210. Twenty-First Congress – 1st Session, 38 NILES’ WEEKLY REGISTER 115, 115 (1830). 
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would grow meaningless if such an array of obligations were assigned to 
him. It would distract him from “studying his books of law.”211 Ultimately, 
Webster proposed a new position, Solicitor of the Treasury: a lawyer to 
supervise the district attorneys.212 
The early attorneys general had different views on the nature of their 
job and the power of the President to direct law enforcement decisions. 
William Wirt, Attorney General to James Monroe and John Quincy Adams, 
insisted that the President had no power to second-guess the decisions of 
executive officials. The President’s job was to see to it that they faithfully 
executed the laws but not to manage particular decisions.213 The distinction 
between the two seemed fairly unproblematic to Wirt. Taking care that the 
law was faithfully executed did not imply the ability to direct or control 
particular decisions. To the contrary, to fulfill his job under the “Take 
Care” clause, the President had to defer to prosecutors’ knowledge and 
expertise. 
Expressing faith in professional expertise, Wirt explained that it was 
not the responsibility of the Attorney General, or the Secretary or 
Comptroller of the Treasury, to instruct the district attorneys in the 
discharge of their duties. The Judiciary Act, according to Wirt, required 
that district attorneys be persons “learned in the law” so that they can 
interpret and apply the law wisely: “It could never have been considered, 
therefore, as among the duties of [the President], that he should instruct and 
direct the district attorneys as to the mere technicalities of their 
profession.”214 Respecting spheres of knowledge and expertise, Wirt 
understood that the President would not necessarily be so “learned.” In 
order to fulfill his obligations, the President had to rely on the legal 
expertise of those around him. In other words, Wirt respected the profes-
sional status of prosecutors at all levels and required government officials 
to defer to their expertise and professional judgment. He read the ambiguity 
of the Judiciary Act with professional norms in mind, concluding that the 
drafters must have intended to leave “technical and professional” details to 
the discretion of lawyers.215 Writing about presidential control over 
accounting officers, Wirt similarly concluded that the duty of the President 
to take care that the laws be faithfully executed does not mean that he is 
 
211.  Id. 
212.  Act of May 29, 1830, ch. 153, 4 Stat. 414, 414–16. 
213.  The President & Accounting Officers, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 624, 624 (1823). 
214.  Att’y Gen. & Dist. Atty’s, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 608, 611 (1823). Wirt explained that the 
Secretary of the Treasury and the Comptroller can similarly do their jobs, but they cannot interfere with 
the pleadings, which ought to be left to the “law-officer intrusted [sic] with that peculiar duty.” Id. Wirt 
viewed the obligation to supervise as the duty to ensure that the official was doing his job with 
“vigilance, industry, and integrity” but not to manage particular decisions. Id. at 612. 
215.  Id. at 613. 
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“required to execute them himself.”216 As long as the officers “discharge 
their duties faithfully, the President has no authority to interfere.”217 
But Wirt’s view was not universal. Roger Taney, Attorney General 
from 1831 to 1833, concluded that the President could order a district 
attorney to discontinue a suit to forfeit stolen jewels belonging to the King 
of the Netherlands. The jewels had been stolen from the royal family and 
smuggled illegally into the United States. The President wanted to return 
the jewels to their owner who had not violated the law. Deriving the 
authority from the President’s duty to take care that the laws are faithfully 
executed, Taney wrote, “I think the President does possess the power. The 
interest of the country and the purposes of justice manifestly require that he 
should possess it.”218 Taney’s view clearly diverged from Wirt’s, but he 
was tentative in his conclusion and the case was one that directly 
implicated foreign relations, another core executive interest. He qualified 
his conclusion by insisting that in this instance justice required the 
President’s intervention. The President’s power was not absolute or 
limitless but rather used sparingly for the sake of justice. Even Taney, who, 
at the time, defended the Jacksonian view of strong executive power, 
agreed with Wirt that the exercise of that power had to further communal 
goals.219 
Scholars who trace the unitary Executive to the early republic recount 
an incident during President Jackson’s administration. During the 
controversy over the United States Bank, Attorney General Taney 
expressed some reservations about the legality of depositing United States 
funds in state banks, at which point President Jackson reportedly replied: 
“Sir, you must find a law authorizing the act or I will appoint an Attorney 
General who will.”220 To proponents of a strong executive, this episode 
shows that the Attorney General was never truly a check on presidential 
power. But it also illustrates that attorneys general, even those who, like 
Taney, were committed to a strong executive, viewed their job as 
 
216.  Id. 
217.  The President & Accounting Officers, 1 Op. Atty. Gen. at 624. 
218.  The Jewels of the Princess of Orange, 2 Op. Atty. Gen. 482, 487 (1831). Wirt did not 
consider representing the government in lower courts as part of his job: “I do not consider myself as the 
advocate of the government . . . but as a judge, called to decide a question of law with the impartiality 
and integrity which characterizes the judician.” CUMMINGS & MCFARLAND, supra note 199, at 90. 
219.  As Attorney General, Roger Taney had helped President Jackson close the Second Bank of 
the United States over the strong objection of members of Senate and Congress. ARTHUR M. 
SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF JACKSON 88–102 (1945). During his tenure as Chief Justice, when 
Lincoln was President, Taney’s position on the power of the Executive shifted dramatically. JAMES F. 
SIMON, LINCOLN AND CHIEF JUSTICE TANEY: SLAVERY, SECESSION, AND THE PRESIDENT’S WAR 193 
(2006). This biographical fact illustrates that attitudes toward presidential power are, at least to a certain 
extent, motivated by politics. 
220.  Senator George H. Williams recounted this exchange, but most consider it apocryphal. 
CUMMINGS & MCFARLAND, supra note 199, at 109. 
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significant. Interpreting the law for the President was not merely an act of 
advocacy but rather a professional exercise distinct from politics. Either 
way, the fate of the bank, like the crown jewels prosecution, was central to 
national economic policy, and the story, while dramatic, is considered by 
most apocryphal. 
The position of attorneys general shifted depending on the issues at 
hand. There was no consensus about the power of the President and 
attitudes changed with practical and political tides. John Crittenden, 
Attorney General during Millard Fillmore’s Presidency, reaffirmed Wirt’s 
modest understanding of presidential power, arguing that the President has 
no power to direct district marshals. He wrote that while it is the duty of the 
President to take care that the federal law is faithfully executed, “it is not, 
in general, judicious for him to interfere with the functions of subordinate 
officers further than to remove them for any neglect or abuse of their 
official trust.”221 The opinion, responding to a New York marshal’s request 
to hire counsel at public expense to defend him in fugitive slave law cases, 
may well have reflected a desire to avoid direct intervention in such a 
contentious issue, but it nonetheless affirmed the independence of subor-
dinate federal officials.222 
As the duties of federal prosecutors expanded along with the scope and 
reach of federal criminal law, the attorneys general were at least sensitive 
to the practical necessity of official discretion. In 1855, Caleb Cushing 
explained that the Executive is vested in one man with the understanding 
that he cannot perform all the tasks on his own but concluded that no head 
of department could directly defy the President because otherwise Congress 
could subvert executive power by dividing it into independent pieces.223 
Unsurprisingly, opinions of the early attorneys general do not reflect a 
consensus on the relationship between the President and federal prose-
cutors. Political exigencies tend to affect views on the power of the 
Executive in general and the President in particular. To the extent that there 
is a uniting thread, it is that where the prosecution concerns an issue that 
otherwise affects the President’s core functions; his ability to interfere is at 
its highest. A president who directs his attorney general ought to do so only 
when it is necessary to promote justice. But there ought to be a respect and 
deference, at the least, to professional prosecutors and other officials, who 
 
221.  Duty of the President Respecting Dist. Marshals, 5 Op. Att’y Gen. 287, 287 (1851). 
222.  Id. Crittenden wrote, “[I]t appears to me most judicious for the President, as well as more 
consistent with the form and spirit of our institutions, to forbear from interference with the functions of 
subordinate public officers, and to leave them to discharge of their proper duties under all their legal 
responsibilities, and subject, also, to removal from office for every neglect or abuse of their official 
trust.” Id. at 288. 
223.  Relation of the President to the Exec. Dep’ts, 7 Op. Att’y Gen. 453, 469–70 (1855). Edward 
Bates expressed a similar opinion about the practical impossibility of actual supervision. Relation of the 
President to the Exec. Dep’ts, 10 Op. Att’y Gen. 527, 528 (1868). 
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have developed expertise in applying the law, and professional norms 
regarding what sort of motivations are appropriate. 
C. The Civil War and Changing Understandings  
of Federal Law Enforcement 
As the country moved toward the Civil War, the scope of federal crimi-
nal law expanded to accommodate the increasingly complex nature of the 
country’s problems. The Attorney General spent a greater portion of his 
time on criminal law enforcement, and the nature of the problems proved 
not only complex but also divisive. To cope with the political and legal 
questions of the day, Attorney General had become a full-time cabinet 
position.224 
Up until this point, the Attorney General exerted minimal control over 
district attorneys in individual criminal cases.225 Recognizing that he 
needed a greater degree of power as the nation moved toward war, 
Attorney General Bates urged the Legislature to consider putting the 
district attorneys under his supervision. Congress ultimately enacted a 
statute granting the Attorney General authority over district attorneys226 and 
enabling him to employ special assistants to help in individual prose-
cutions.227 The Supreme Court held nonetheless that, while the Attorney 
General had general supervisory authority, it was the sole duty of local 
district attorneys to represent the United States in civil and criminal 
cases.228 
Edward Bates, Attorney General for President Lincoln, was contro-
versial, and history has not been entirely kind to him. Among other things, 
he issued an opinion supporting Lincoln’s decision to suspend habeas 
rights, which most legal scholars have considered illegal.229 Given this 
criticism, his professed view of the office as independent from the Presi-
dent might seem ironic. He wrote, “The office I hold is not properly 
political, but strictly legal; and it is my duty above all other ministers of 
 
224.  Baker, supra note 185, at 59. 
225.  See Att’y General & Dist. Attorneys, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 608, 611 (1823); The Jewels of the 
Princess of Orange, 2 Op. Att’y Gen. 482, 491–92 (1831); Office & Duties of the Att’y Gen., 6 Op. 
Att’y Gen. 326, 338 (1854). Cushing insisted that it was wrong to interfere in individual cases. Gov’t 
Suits, 8 Op. Att’y Gen. 465 (1855). 
226.  Act of Aug. 2, 1861, ch. 37, § 1, 12 Stat. 285, 285. Congress quickly passed an explanatory 
act, noting that the Solicitor of the Treasury still retained control over the district attorneys. Act of Aug. 
6, 1861, ch. 65, 12 Stat. 327, 327. 
227.  Id. § 2, 12 Stat. at 285. 
228.  Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. 454, 457 (1868). 
229.  See AMANDA L. TYLER, HABEAS CORPUS IN WARTIME: FROM THE TOWER OF LONDON TO 
GUANTANAMO BAY 185–199 (2017) (criticizing Lincoln’s suspension of habeas during the Civil War); 
see also Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2007) (extending habeas protection to enemy combatants 
detained in Guantanamo Bay). 
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State to uphold the Law and to resist all encroachments, from whatever 
quarter, of mere will and power.”230 The irony, however, reflects the reality 
that political and practical pressures tend to motivate presidents and their 
attorneys general. Despite these exigencies, actors for the most part have 
not lost sight of the ideal of independence that ran from Wirt’s tenure 
through the mid-nineteenth century, despite the changes in the nature of the 
job. 
Even by mid-century, it was unclear who, if anyone, controlled district 
attorneys’ decision-making. The early controversies over the Whiskey 
Rebellion and similar prosecutions with national implications were no 
longer the norm. The President was otherwise occupied. The tradition of 
prosecutorial independence, in part, grew out of this practical reality. But 
as the economic and social life of the nation grew more complex, the 
system of independent local federal law officers proved chaotic, leaving the 
application of federal law inconsistent and unpredictable.231 Attorney 
General Randolph sought control over local law enforcement officers in 
1791, but it was not until 1850 that his demands seemed pressing.232 The 
move toward centralization thus had little to do with presidential power and 
more to do with coordination and even-handed justice. One could have 
tried to ensure consistency by centralizing control, but instead, Congress 
sought to minimize vagaries and injustice by professionalizing the job. 
While bills were being introduced to formalize the law department, the 
Attorney General was gradually taking responsibility for more tasks, as the 
scope and complexity of criminal law continued to grow. Attorney General 
Caleb Cushing pushed for greater official control over the law business of 
the country, explaining that, while the executive power is vested in the 
President, he could not perform all executive duties by himself, and many 
responsibilities had to be delegated.233 Cushing further explained that when 
the President delegates duties to officials, their work must be their own 
rather than the President’s.234 Despite his understanding of official 
discretion, Cushing concluded that the department heads could not 
“lawfully perform an official act against the will of the President.”235 
As the nation neared the Civil War, the stakes of the legal questions 
were higher. District attorneys reached out to Attorney General Bates for 
 
230.  Arthur Selwyn Miller, The Attorney General as the President’s Lawyer, in ROLES OF THE 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 41, 51 (1968). 
231.  See ROBERT J. KACZOROWSKI, THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION: THE FEDERAL 
COURTS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND CIVIL RIGHTS, 1866–1876, at 81 (1985). 
232.  CUMMINGS & MCFARLAND, supra note 199, at 142; see supra notes 210–12 (discussing 
earlier attempts by Webster to centralize the law department). 
233.  Relationship of the President to the Exec. Dep’ts, 7 Op. Att’y Gen. 453, 460 (1855). 
234.  Id. at 463. 
235.  Id. at 469–70. 
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direction in how to apply federal criminal law during the mounting 
insurrection. Controlled chaos reigned as members of the military some-
times took matters into their own hands. The necessity for centralized 
control grew increasingly obvious and elusive at the same time.236 After 
Lincoln was assassinated, Bates criticized his successor, Attorney General 
James Speed, insisting that he was a political hack, not a real professional, 
“with not much reputation as a lawyer, and perhaps, no strong confidence 
in his own opinions, he was caressed and courted . . . and sank . . . into a 
mere tool—to give such opinions as were wanted.”237 The President was 
involved in decisions about whether to try leaders of the Confederacy, and 
district attorneys deferred despite pressure from Congress.238 Bates 
expressed concern that a weak and unprincipled attorney general would not 
stand up to a president. The rule of law would cave if he did not insist on 
the legality of the President’s actions. Bates was sure that, to resist 
improper pressure, a lawyer needed professional knowledge and confi-
dence, qualities lacking in his successor. 
D. The Creation of the Department of Justice in 1870 
The Civil War left numerous legal problems in its wake. The most 
obvious—the civil rights of the newly emancipated slaves—were not 
necessarily considered the most pressing. There were issues of land 
ownership, debt, and taxes. The DOJ was finally created amidst this chaos, 
if not entirely because of it.239 Jed Shugarman has argued that the statute 
creating the DOJ and consolidating its power under the Executive was not 
established to increase the power of the federal government or to protect 
the civil rights of newly emancipated black citizens, but rather as an effort 
to cut budgets and trim excessive spending.240 The DOJ did not grow out of 
a concerted campaign to build the federal government in the wake of the 
Civil War, but it did reflect a trend toward professionalization.241 This 
Subpart argues that the two are not inconsistent. The effort to install 
professional lawyers and rationalize an increasingly splintered system 
provided a way to justify, or at least address, concerns about the increase in 
power at the executive level.242 
 
236.  See generally CUMMINGS & MCFARLAND, supra note 199, at 188–217. 
237.  Id. at 204. 
238.  Id. at 207–08. 
239.  Jed Handelsman Shugarman, The Creation of the Department of Justice: Professional-
ization Without Civil Rights or Civil Service, 66 STAN. L. REV. 121, 122–23 (2014). 
240.  Id. at 123. 
241.  Id. 
242.  The Civil War and Reconstruction gave birth to the modern American state. Regulatory 
agencies and civil service reform were central to the consolidation of federal power. RICHARD 
1 GREEN-ROIPHE-1-76 (DO NOT DELETE) 10/17/2018  10:59 AM 
50 ALABAMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:1:1 
As Stephen Skowronek and other historians have argued, the birth of 
the administrative state during the last decades of the nineteenth century 
coincided with a new faith in professionalism and expertise to combat the 
degenerative nature of party politics and the corrosive effects of capitalism. 
Professional associations emerged, along with the research university, at 
the end of the century with a mission, not only to bring rationalization and 
order to the federal government, but also to promote expertise, study, and 
professionalism as mechanisms to combat corruption, waste, and the 
excesses of a capitalist economy.243 Historians have traced this civil service 
reform impulse to post-war movements, which were eventually led by the 
Mugwumps and, later, Progressive-era reformers.244 Prior to the Pendleton 
Act of 1883, which reformed the bureaucracy and created the Civil Service 
Commission, civil service members largely were aspiring politicians who 
owed allegiance only to the party members who appointed them. Reform 
changed both the nature of the job and the social class of those who filled 
it. 
Civil service reform itself was part of an effort to check the corrupt 
accumulation of power with a body of experts, who were career employees 
with particular expertise and no direct ties to the party in power. Some 
scholars argue that when the Tenure in Office Act,245 which allowed the 
Senate to reject the President’s choice to remove a department head, was 
repealed in 1869, the notion of a unitary Executive was affirmed.246 This 
argument overlooks the fact that professional norms of government lawyers 
were seen as an important check on presidential power even if the chief 
executive retained the sole authority to remove officers. While the Revised 
Tenure in Office Act did consolidate most removal power in the White 
House, it “block[ed] [the President’s] power to fire U.S. Attorneys and 
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(2006) (pointing to 1873 legislation to increase congressional salaries as part of a sustained 
anticorruption reform movement). 
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other principal officers,” limiting his control over federal prosecution.247 It 
created a permanent corps of civil servants whose positions rested on merit 
rather than spoils. This contributed to a shift from parochial politics to 
nationalism, but it did so not simply by expanding executive power, but by 
altering and in some ways limiting the political power of the President and 
appointed department heads within the Executive.248 In other words, the 
diffuse nature of governance was not eliminated but rather imported into 
the structure of the administrative state. 
Like the growth of the administrative state, the consolidation of the 
government’s legal work within the DOJ was designed to preserve 
professional norms as both a check on executive power and an antidote to 
local corruption.249 While attorneys general over the past century had 
disagreed over the relationship between the President and his law enforce-
ment officers and often acted to increase the power of the incumbent 
President, they all, to some degree or another, subscribed to Wirt’s 
understanding of the profession and its role in government. 
In discussing the proposed act to create a law department, legislators 
expressed a desire to regulate the abuse of party patronage. As Senator 
James A. Bayard explained, “[t]he object of the bill is the prevention of 
what I may call the sporadic system of paying fees to persons, not to speak 
disrespectfully of them, who may be called departmental favorites.”250 The 
bill, as one legislator explained, “takes care, then, that these officers shall 
be well informed on legal questions.”251 While some expressed concern that 
the bill would increase the size and the expense of government, its 
proponents assured them that it was designed to create efficiency. The 
professional nature of a legal department would prevent both error and 
waste.252 Skill, expertise, and knowledge would create efficiency, which in 
turn would ensure fairness.253 
A centralized law department would not only preserve quality and 
efficiency, but also prevent cronyism and draw on professionalism to 
prevent both political and personal incentives from perverting criminal 
 
247.  Shugarman, supra note 239, at 150. 
248.  See Ari Hoogenboom, The Pendleton Act and the Civil Service, 64 AM. HIST. REV. 301, 
317–18 (1959). 
249.  A Department of Justice, 8 ALB. L.J. 274, 274 (1873) (arguing that the competence, skill, 
and efficiency of a bureau staffed by professionals will combat waste and corruption). 
250.  CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 4490 (1870). 
251.  CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3065 (1870). 
252.  CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3034–35 (1870). 
253.  Its author explained that “[o]ne of the objects of this bill is to establish a staff of law officers 
sufficiently numerous and of sufficient ability to transact this law business of the Government in all 
parts of the United States.” CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3035 (1870). 
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justice.254 Representative Thomas Jenckes, who introduced the bill and 
ushered it through Congress, explained: 
We have found, too, that these law officers, being subject to the control of 
the heads of the Departments, in some instances give advice which seems 
to have been instigated by the heads of the Department, or at least advice 
which seems designed to strengthen the resolution to which the head of 
the Department may have come in a particular instance.255 
District attorneys and their paid assistants in the West often acted in their 
own interest or corruptly helped themselves and their allies. Paid by the 
case or fine, they pursued cases that had little merit.256 By consolidating all 
legal personnel under the Attorney General, the authors of the bill hoped to 
remove the taint of this sort of cronyism and promote independence by 
creating a purely professional branch of government. Prosecutors would 
serve the law rather than the highest bidder or a partisan political master. 
Jenckes was concerned not only with legislative overreach, but also 
with the ability of the Executive to use patronage as a way of 
circumventing political checks.257 President Johnson had appointed friends 
and allies to halt the progress of Radical Republicans in Congress.258 Civil 
service reform, in general, and the DOJ in particular, would curb executive 
and congressional abuses by ensuring an “independent administration of 
affairs.”259 Jenckes explained: “The humblest servant of the Government 
should not be at the mercy or the caprice of the most distinguished 
politician. Let every man who may receive a commission from the United 
States know that he holds it from the people, in service of the people.”260 
Jenckes held up the military as an example of independent professional 
pride in service, which acts as a break on partisan politics. 
While Jenckes acknowledged that attorneys general had in the past 
issued opinions just to suit the political view of the Administration, he 
labeled it “a misfortune” and insisted that the consolidation of all legal 
work in one department would reduce such deviations from the pure 
practice of law.261 Like his predecessors, he expressed faith in the clearly 
 
254.  The expulsion of many Democratic politicians after the Civil War led to an increase in 
corruption and cronyism in politics, which fueled the Mugwumps’ reform movement. In addition, 
weaknesses in American bureaucracy grew more apparent as wartime demands increased. 
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distinguishable realms of law and politics. When confronted with the 
anecdote about President Jackson ordering his Attorney General to write an 
opinion justifying the deposit of federal funds, Jenckes replied: “I have 
heard such anecdotes. It is true that the head of a Department or the 
President may act on his own responsibility, but he cannot in such a case 
shelter himself behind the opinion of a solicitor.”262 In other words, the 
consolidation of federal legal work in the DOJ would render purely 
political decisions transparent because the legal advice would inevitably be 
professional and shielded from the taint of political expediency. 
The new statutes enacted to preserve civil rights in the South tested the 
new department, thrusting it into the business of criminal law enforcement 
on an unprecedented scale.263 Federal prosecutors called for assistance in 
interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment and the criminal provisions in the 
statutes known as the Enforcement and Ku Klux Klan Acts amidst strong 
resistance in the South. Witnesses who feared for their lives appealed 
directly to the President for assistance.264 Up until the Civil War, state 
prosecutors were responsible for most criminal prosecutions. The structure 
of the federal criminal justice system was still so diffuse that it was difficult 
for the Attorney General to exert control over federal prosecution.265 
During early Reconstruction, the Attorney General struggled to control 
local federal prosecutors. Local law enforcement was either too weak or 
disinclined to prosecute the Ku Klux Klan, and Attorney General 
Ackerman “issued a circular to all United States Attorneys” and Marshals 
to enforce the new laws.266 For several years, the Administration and 
Attorney General tried to use the central structure of the DOJ to ensure that 
federal policy priorities were honored. Despite the effort, there were few 
enforcement actions, proving how stubborn and persistent the local, diffuse 
nature of criminal law enforcement was.267 In 1871, Ackerman suddenly 
resigned.268 Despite his resignation, the DOJ continued its vigorous 
enforcement through 1873. The DOJ grew in both size and power to meet 
these demands. As political parties warred over the nature of civil rights, 
the future of the DOJ lay in large part in criminal law enforcement, and the 
DOJ lawyers were more overt about their political commitments and party 
loyalty.269 
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Increasingly, disagreement over Reconstruction policies in the DOJ 
focused on the independence of the agency. As in the early cases, in which 
presidents felt the need to intervene, the national interests were high. 
Criminal cases coincided with national policy. By 1873, the political incli-
nation to enforce the civil rights laws had ebbed. One journalist complained 
in The Nation of the “inflation” of federal law enforcement power: “[T]he 
Attorney-General’s office has become a kind of political bureau.”270 The 
article noted that the Attorney General was not directly politically accoun-
table. This might be tolerable, but he had “not displayed any talent either 
legal or political . . . . He is, moreover, acting as the servant of a President 
who treats his ministers as members of his staff.”271 The author took for 
granted that prosecutors are not the same as staff members subject to any 
direct order. 
The progressive faith in expertise and training spurred civil service 
reform in this period. The work of governing required merit, training, and 
education. Far from serving these ends, short terms of service and elections 
led to a corrupt system of patronage. Woodrow Wilson published a book in 
1885 arguing for a merit system, which would leave much of the work of 
government to experts.272 In making his argument, Wilson explained that 
the Executive was divided between elected officials who make policy and 
those who govern through learning and experience. “The President is not 
all of the Executive. He cannot get along without the men whom he 
appoints . . . and they are really integral parts of that branch of the 
government which he titularly contains in his one single person.”273 
Cabinet heads “were always recognized units in the system, never mere 
ciphers to the Presidential figure which led them. Their wills counted as 
independent wills.”274 Quoting MacMillan’s magazine, Wilson wrote that 
“[e]ach cabinet officer . . . controls his own department pretty much as he 
pleases,”275 and that the Executive itself is made up of a number of 
different individuals who retain independence, power, and control.276 
Critical of the inefficiency that came with the separation of powers, Wilson 
posited a permanent and powerfully trained civil service, which would 
retain a good deal of control over the business of governing.277 
While the intention was clear, the statute did not rid the federal system 
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of its decentralized nature, and old reporting lines and allegiances 
remained.278 The professionalization of the DOJ required isolation from the 
business of administration. Theodore Roosevelt explained that politicians 
also needed to respect attorneys’ obligations. He wrote to his Attorney 
General: 
Of all the officers of the Government, those of the Department of Justice 
should be kept most free from any suspicion of improper action on 
partisan or factional grounds . . . so that there shall be gradually a 
growth . . . in the knowledge that the Federal courts and the represen-
tatives of the Federal Department of Justice insist on meting out even-
handed justice . . . .”279 
Once again, even-handed justice seemed a relatively unproblematic term, 
an accessible norm, as long as prosecutors and other government attorneys 
were insulated from political control. 
The DOJ was thus designed as an insular arena where lawyer 
professionals could thrive. Merit, standards of practice, and a common 
approach to legal problems would lend both quality and uniformity to 
federal law enforcement. Professionalism was designed to combat political 
pressure; therefore, presidential or other political control of prosecutors 
was inconsistent with the vision behind the law department. 
E. Early Twentieth Century 
Despite the new law establishing the DOJ, the legal work of the 
country remained decentralized. Lines of reporting were weak and depart-
ment heads retained control of legal work.280 Early twentieth-century 
treatises similarly embraced a presidency balanced and checked by admini-
stration, rather than a hierarchical bureaucracy controlled entirely by the 
President. 
In the United States it was undoubtedly intended that the President should 
be little more than a political chief; that is to say, one whose functions 
should, in the main, consist in the performance of those political duties 
which are not subject to judicial control. It is quite clear that it was 
intended that he should not, except as to these political matters, be the 
administrative head of the government, with general power of directing 
and controlling the acts of subordinate federal administrative agents.281 
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The treatise continued, however, that the need for efficiency in an increa-
singly complex world had led to a growingly centralized power. The author 
insisted that while a president could not directly control the decisions of a 
district attorney, the power of removal leant him that indirect authority.282 
In the beginning of the twentieth century, the federal regulatory state 
was transforming. There was less antipathy to large government as 
reformers increasingly turned to legislatures and administrative bodies to 
temper the effects of the modern industrial economy.283 The fight against 
corruption joined forces with the Progressive search for efficiency and 
economy. Expert centralized control was seen as the antidote to local, 
disorganized, corrupt party politics. By 1920, Congress had successfully 
resisted the executive effort to consolidate control over the federal 
bureaucracy.284 Congress established connection with administrative agen-
cies and career civil servants. 
By 1908, Wilson, who had initially suggested that the Legislature 
retain the greatest amount of power, had recognized the value of a strong 
Executive, but he still noted the importance of a permanent, trained, expert 
civil service as a check on partisan excess.285 The desire for coordination, 
efficiency, and organic energy led him to favor consolidation of power, but 
it also fed his faith in expertise and experience in the bureaucratic manage-
ment as a way to prevent the abuse of that power. 
As the administrative state expanded and consolidated, the President 
was not the clear winner. When the army and bureaucracy grew out of 
necessity to meet the demands of World War I, agencies maintained signi-
ficant independence. In 1918, now-President Wilson issued an executive 
order calling for the consolidation of all legal work under the DOJ.286 
Despite President Wilson’s edict, Congress continued to disperse control of 
the legal work of the government.287 The Attorney General complained as 
late as 1928 about the DOJ’s lack of centralized control.288 
The American state itself was born and grew to maturity as a bulwark 
against despotism.289 Thus, as the demands of the modern world grew more 
complex, the checks and balances within government grew more numer-
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ous.290 Organized governance and power dispersed. Civil service reform 
and the DOJ were part of this process. The larger and more powerful the 
state became, the more it developed multiple creative checks on its power. 
This centrifugal force continued to disperse power among local district 
attorneys and other government lawyers.291 Even though the DOJ was more 
centralized than its precursor, it was still vast, and power still resided in 
relatively autonomous local units.292 Far from a clear consolidation of 
executive power under the President, the professionalization of prosecution 
maintained the diffuse authority that characterized the origins of American 
criminal justice. As a result, the expansion of national power did not 
necessarily risk the consolidation of power. 
Justice Southerland explained how professionalism worked to retain 
the diffuse nature of power in the context of independent commissions: 
The commission is to be non-partisan; and it must, from the very nature of 
its duties, act with entire impartiality. It is charged with the enforcement 
of no policy except the policy of the law. Its duties are neither political 
nor executive, but predominantly quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative. [I]ts 
members are called upon to exercise the trained judgment of a body of 
experts appointed by law and informed by experience.293 
Respect for law and the traditions of the agency itself would govern the 
commission. Independence was a product of isolation, expertise, and 
historical respect for the nature of its work. The DOJ was created in this 
model. 
During the Progressive Era and the New Deal, most lawmakers and 
policy experts grew more comfortable with the idea of an active state, 
involved in solving both social and economic problems.294 Those disillu-
sioned with party politics gravitated to expertise, organizational efficiency, 
and professionalism. It is understandable in this context that the DOJ drew 
fewer critics. A department filled with professionals would withstand the 
inappropriate pressures of partisan and personal interest. Meanwhile, 
federal criminal law expanded. Prohibition, labor unrest, and organized 
crime led to a proliferation of federal criminal statutes and law enforcement 
personnel.295 
Some have argued that during this time the Attorney General took on a 
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more directly political role. As the economy grew, even independent and 
strong-willed attorneys general consulted the President on some cases, 
especially antitrust cases that had important implications for national 
economic development. Theodore Roosevelt’s Attorney General, Philander 
Knox, for example, deferred to the President on individual antitrust 
cases.296 Born of a generation of reformers, however, President Roosevelt 
respected prosecutorial independence, insisting on bipartisan commissions 
to investigate political corruption.297 Knox’s successor, George W. 
Wickersham, at times, argued for instituting criminal prosecutions in 
individual cases, but President Taft disagreed, urging civil action first. 
Wickersham, like Knox, ultimately deferred to the President and declined 
to bring criminal charges.298 
In the famous Ballinger–Pinchot controversy in 1909, the Bar 
Association and the public recoiled at the President’s interference with a 
criminal investigation. President Taft appointed an anticonservationist, 
Richard Ballinger, to serve as Secretary of the Interior. Gifford Pinchot, a 
strong conservationist who had been appointed by William McKinley as 
head of the Department of Forestry, accused Ballinger of corruptly 
interfering with investigations out of his own personal interest in the 
corporate targets.299 Despite evidence that this may in fact have occurred, 
President Taft, relying on what he claimed were Attorney General 
Wickersham’s investigation and recommendation, exonerated Ballinger 
and fired Pinchot. President Taft himself later admitted that the 
Wickersham letter was backdated to appear as if it had been prepared 
before the firing when it was actually written after the fact. He relied 
instead on the findings of an official within the Department of the Interior, 
who was a political ally of Ballinger.300 While Taft admitted to rejecting the 
legal opinion of the Assistant Attorney General, he insisted that the 
Attorney General shared his view of the merits of the case.301 The President 
had essentially used the Attorney General to undercut the normal criminal 
justice process, which would have led to greater transparency at least.302 
Some grew concerned at the growing power of the Attorney General, 
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unchecked by the normal political processes. Philander Knox wrote, “The 
consideration of the probable ultimate effect of the establishment of such 
power in the hands of an administrative, non-judicial officer should give 
rise to grave concern.”303 But, others remained sanguine that the separation 
of the legal department from the business of administration would ensure 
that the law remained unsullied and that the lawyers would fulfill their 
semijudicial function “and gauge the temper of the courts.”304 The 1912 
Attorney General Annual Report argued for greater consolidation of power 
within the DOJ, suggesting that other departments with administrative 
responsibilities threatened to corrupt the professional judgment of their 
lawyers.305 Homer Cummings, Attorney General from 1933 to 1939, felt it 
was a necessity for the DOJ to be independent and free from the “problems 
of administrative expediency.”306 
The battle over removal power stretched over years, with presidents 
seeking to exert control over executive officers. The dispute culminated in 
the Supreme Court decision Myers v. United States discussed above. Critics 
worried that vesting removal power with the President would undermine 
official independence.307 Edward Corwin, for instance, argued that it was 
increasingly important to protect expert appointments and commissions 
from political manipulation.308 The scientific idea of government, like the 
scientific idea of law in vogue at the time, required individuals to resolve 
complex problems by understanding and applying scientific research 
methods to the facts.309 To promote this, Corwin echoed the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Myers, by proposing that political appointees direct 
policy but leave it to the permanent skilled professional class of bureaucrats 
to administer it.310 
The battle over court administration marked an interbranch competition 
over power, with the Attorney General at the center. In 1922, Congress 
passed the Judicial Conference Act, a compromise between the nationalists, 
who advocated greater centralization and coordination of the Judiciary, and 
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their adversaries, who were wary of the concentration of power.311 The 
Attorney General was given the task of reporting on the business of the 
federal courts and making recommendations.312 President Taft used the 
Attorney General to try to exert control over the federal Judiciary and 
Congress. But Congress was resistant, and when President Roosevelt tried 
to control the Judiciary with the famous court-packing plan, Congress 
passed a new act removing the Attorney General from the judicial admini-
strative scheme.313 By eliminating the role of the Attorney General, the 
Administrative Office Act of 1939 was designed to remove the courts from 
presidential control and return power to the various circuit courts.314 
Despite the persistent effort by presidents to use their attorneys general 
to manage the courts, the position remained mostly insulated from political 
disputes.315 The norm of loyalty battled with the norm of independence, but 
neither receded entirely. Amidst the struggle for control over the Attorney 
General, in reality, the DOJ still retained the legacy of its early diffuse 
structure. United States Attorneys still retained a great deal of indepen-
dence from “main justice,” often eluding the control of the Attorney 
General.316 
The New Deal and the political climate of the 1930s posed a series of 
challenges to the nature of law and legal structures. The financial collapse 
required greater central control over law, as well as other aspects of 
governance.317 President Franklin Roosevelt issued an executive order 
asserting the DOJ’s control over United States Attorneys and marshals.318 
The growing complexity of the law coincided with threats of fascism from 
Germany and communism from the Soviet Union. Amidst these minefields, 
the United States had to find a way to legitimate an expansive admini-
strative state in a pluralistic society.319 The Process School did so, in part, 
by asking who ought to make decisions and which institutional structures 
would prove optimal for each decision.320 Essentially, as H.L.A. Hart 
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would later explain, officials will always have to resolve indeterminacy in 
the law. The key is choosing the officials and institutions that are best 
situated to make reasoned choices.321 
It is in this context that Attorney General Robert Jackson explained to a 
room full of United States Attorneys that the political accountability that 
comes with appointment and removal is not enough to assure justice. He 
explained, “Your responsibility in your several districts for law 
enforcement and for its methods cannot be wholly surrendered to 
Washington, and ought not to be assumed by a centralized Department of 
Justice.”322 He explained that Washington should rarely direct United 
States Attorneys, who are best situated to ensure that justice is done.323 The 
DOJ may have a role in establishing policy priorities and ensuring 
uniformity in federal law but ought not manage individual cases. This 
decentralized system of justice helps insulate prosecutors from the 
corrosive effects of partisan politics.324 Their independence, not only from 
political actors but also from mob sentiment, helps ensure that justice is 
done despite times of fear or hysteria. 
During World War II, President Roosevelt relied on his attorneys 
general to help justify his political agenda. Attorney General Robert 
Jackson, for instance, issued an opinion concluding that the United States 
could sell ships to Great Britain before entering the war, without the 
Senate’s approval.325 His successor, Attorney General Frances Biddle, 
expressed initial reservations about the legality of Japanese internment 
camps but ultimately went along with Roosevelt’s plan. Just months later, 
Roosevelt instructed Biddle, against Biddle’s initial judgment, to try Nazi 
saboteurs in military court where they could be executed.326 While presi-
dents increasingly sought to use their attorneys general to help further 
political ends, the DOJ itself maintained its identity as an independent 
agency. Despite his own actions, Biddle expressed concern about the 
 
Calabresi, An Introduction to Legal Thought: Four Approaches to Law and to the Allocation of Body 
Parts, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2113, 2123 (2003). 
321.  See Hart, supra note 9. 
322.  Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 3, 3 (1940). 
323.  Id. at 3–4. 
324.  Id. at 4. Many argued that politics were corrupting prosecution on both the federal and local 
level. Standards for character and excellence were being replaced by partisan concerns that interfered 
with the administration of justice. See, e.g., George E.Q. Johnson, Investigation and Detection of Crime 
from the Prosecutor’s Viewpoint, 40 COM. L.J. 123, 125 (1940); Lloyd W. Kennedy, Local Politics vs. 
Prosecuting Attorney, 23 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y 180, 181 (1940). Tenure in office and removal 
from politics were seen as the remedy. What is a Department of Justice?, 19 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y 
74, 76 (1935). 
325.  William R. Casto, Attorney General Robert Jackson’s Brief Encounter with the Notion of 
Preclusive Presidential Power, 30 PACE L. REV. 364, 365–66 (2010). 
326.  David J. Danelski, The Saboteurs’ Case, 21 J. SUP. CT. HIST. no. 1 1996, at 61, 65. 
1 GREEN-ROIPHE-1-76 (DO NOT DELETE) 10/17/2018  10:59 AM 
62 ALABAMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:1:1 
political pressures to become a tool for partisan ends.327 
F. Watergate and the Role of Professional Norms 
Until recent events, the Saturday Night Massacre was the most public 
assault on prosecutorial independence in American history. A less well-
known controversy during the Nixon administration also launched a debate 
about the centrality of the independence of the DOJ to American demo-
cracy. International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation (IT&T) donated 
$400,000 for the 1972 Republican National Convention to be held in San 
Diego. At the time, IT&T’s future was dependent on federal law enforce-
ment authorities. It needed DOJ approval to merge with Hartford Fire 
Insurance, and it was in the midst of settling several other antitrust cases as 
well. The White House tapes ultimately revealed that President Nixon 
ordered then-Deputy Attorney General Richard Kleindienst to tell Richard 
McLaren, the Assistant Attorney General in charge of Antitrust, to drop the 
IT&T appeal: 
Nixon: I want something clearly understood, and, if it is not understood, 
McLaren’s ass is to be out within one hour. The IT & T thing—stay the 
hell out of it. Is that clear? That’s an order. . . . 
 
Kleindienst: Okay.328 
Attorney General John Mitchell tried to intervene to prevent Nixon from 
undermining the independent antitrust enforcement. He later told 
Kleindienst, “By the way . . . your friend at the White House says that you 
can handle your fucking antitrust cases any way you want.”329 Nixon 
criticized Mitchell for clinging to professional norms: “Mitchell . . . didn’t 
want to be political.”330 In a memorandum to Haldeman, Nixon wrote: 
“[W]hen Mitchell leaves as attorney general, we’re going to be better off in 
my view . . . . John is just too damn good a lawyer, you know. He’s a good, 
strong lawyer. It just repels him to do these horrible things, but they’ve got 
to be done.”331 
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Nixon acknowledged and dismissed the role of professional 
independence in one breath. Before the President’s true motive was 
revealed, the White House had defended itself on the ground that it 
interfered in the antitrust case because the DOJ’s positions were 
inconsistent with the Administration’s policy that bigness is not necessarily 
unlawful.332 McLaren testified that he pursued the case because he felt that 
he had an obligation to advance “the public interest.”333 Others in the DOJ 
agreed that the appeal would have promoted the public interest in 
effectively enforcing the antitrust laws.334 Without the benefit of the taped 
conversations, it is hard for any third party to untangle proper policy 
motivations from improper political or personal ones. 
 The Watergate scandal shocked the legal and political communities and 
led them to examine the relationship between the White House and 
government lawyers. While Part I explored the legal ramifications of the 
scandal, this Part describes the formal articulation of professional values 
that followed, as well as the structural changes that were designed to 
preserve them. If the DOJ was born, in part, to protect prosecutorial 
independence from the infiltration of partisan motives, it had fallen far 
short of these expectations. As they debated different solutions, lawmakers 
for the most part agreed that prosecutorial independence and professional 
norms offered the best bulwark against the political appropriation of the 
DOJ. 
Ultimately, lawmakers concluded that it was impossible to enact laws 
to prevent partisan corruption without simultaneously undermining the 
political accountability of the chief prosecutor. Unwilling to sacrifice 
accountability for independence, scholars and legislators returned to profes-
sionalism to protect against corruption. Ironically, this sentiment came at a 
time when scholars and politicians were growing increasingly skeptical of 
the ability of expertise and professionalism to preserve the integrity of 
government process, and the country had just witnessed perhaps the 
greatest failure of ethical norms to guide government actors. The respect 
for expertise that had given rise to the administrative state was waning. Far 
from the perfect antidote to corruption, experts and profes-sionals, it 
seemed, were motivated by the same personal, private interests as poli-
ticians.335 Lawmakers, nonetheless, invoked an older ideal of profession-
alism and a faith that law and politics could be separated. In this context, 
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professional independence took on a new valence. Rather than denoting a 
devotion to legal norms, it more closely resembled personal integrity and a 
respect for process. 
In the wake of the scandal, Senator Sam Ervin proposed a law that 
would have made the DOJ independent from the Executive Branch.336 
Another less radical bill introduced at the same time proposed a permanent 
special counsel insulated from executive control.337 The discussion sur-
rounding these bills amplified a chorus that had been building through-out 
American history about the role of professional norms and expertise within 
the Executive. Ultimately, legislators agreed to preserve the Executive 
Branch’s control over government lawyers, but its power had to be limited 
by professional norms. The changes in internal DOJ regulations similarly 
reflected this respect for prosecutorial discretion and ethical obligations as 
a limit on presidential power. 
The hearings were full of eloquent statements about the rule of law and 
lamentations about how politics had infiltrated the DOJ. As Senator Alan 
Cranston explained, “[a]s the petty and gross misdeeds of Watergate 
continue to come to light, we see more clearly the need for some machinery 
independent of the executive which will ferret out and prosecute corruption 
and wrongdoing in high levels of government.”338 He went on to qualify 
that the Attorney General’s role as a prosecutor should form an important 
restraint on presidential power: the Attorney General’s “client is not only 
the President of the United States but includes the people.”339 The position 
of the Attorney General, he lamented, had become a tool of the Admini-
stration, corrupted by power and politics, and the key was to restore the 
professional independent role.340 
Ervin’s bill was met with resistance. Even Senator Cranston, who 
shared Ervin’s concerns, was hesitant to remove the Attorney General from 
the political process. Accountability is perhaps the most fundamental check 
on the abuse of power. But accountability alone had proven ineffective. As 
Theodore Sorensen, former Special Counsel to President Kennedy 
explained, the Attorney General should not become a “mere political arm 
of the White House, motivated principally by partisan considerations, its 
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powers exploited for political ends.”341 But Sorensen hesitated to endorse 
either bill: 
An Attorney General of the caliber of Francis Biddle or Elliot Richardson 
who recognizes that he is an officer of the court as well as a member of 
the Cabinet, and that his client is the Nation as well as the President, will 
have sufficient fidelity to both his professional and his public obligations 
to resist improper White House intrusion without any change in the exi-
sting statutory or institutional arrangement.342 
Professional training and norms must resolve the conflict between 
political accountability and professional independence. Ervin summarized, 
“So in the last analysis, in your judgment, the thing comes down to the 
man.”343 Independence had grown synonymous with character and personal 
integrity. 
Expressing a stronger faith in the ability to distinguish law and politics, 
Mitchell Rogovin, formerly an Assistant Attorney General explained: 
While there may be a Republican way to conduct foreign policy which is 
“politically and philosophically” different from the Democratic way, there 
should be no acceptable difference in the manner in which a tax evasion 
trial is conducted or a civil rights desegregation order is implemented. 
Justice is not only blind, but she must also be nonpartisan.344 
Some voiced a strong commitment to the power of the Executive, but 
even they saw the law and professional norms as a restraint on presidential 
control. Robert Dixon, a former Assistant Attorney General and scholar, 
explained: 
One aspect which the Framers never foresaw is the role of the bureau-
cracy. The Department is heavily staffed with lawyers of long experience 
below the paper-thin political level. As a rule cases work their way up 
through the Department with facts and law developed to the point that 
political appointees could not make them disappear and go away, even if 
they were so inclined.345 
Despite his strong unitary view of the President’s power, Dixon 
conceded that a prosecutor’s professional duty makes it inappropriate and 
impossible for the President or any other political operative to interfere 
with criminal cases.346 Emphasizing the practical reality of America’s 
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criminal justice system, he insisted that the diffuse nature of federal 
prosecution ensures that those responsible for daily decisions are insulated 
from illegitimate partisan concerns.347 
Grappling with the difficulty in distinguishing proper policy motives 
from partisan or personal interest, Watergate prompted a return to the 
notion of professionalism.348 Professionalism and devotion to ethics 
theoretically provide immunity from capture. As former Attorney General 
Ramsey Clark explained, “[t]he U.S. Department of Justice . . . is peopled 
in the main by Americans devoted to the rule of law and to justice.”349 
Independence, in this formulation, is a personal trait rather than a natural 
byproduct of the unique nature of the law. Former Solicitor General 
Archibald Cox, who also served as Watergate special prosecutor until he 
was fired, invoked norms of legal practice to explain the role of Attorney 
General: 
[I]t is every lawyer’s duty to give his client advice that the client may not 
like to hear, to tell him what his obligations are under the law. That 
obligation rests upon an Attorney General in dealing with his client, the 
President, just as it does on all other lawyers.350 
Just as the lawyer is not the client, so too the Attorney General is not the 
President. In the modern political system, he will likely be a political ally 
of the President, but he is not a servant. What distinguishes between the 
two is the ethical obligation to apply the law in a fair, even-handed, and 
disinterested way. While Cox may have overstated the equivalence 
between a civil lawyer and the Attorney General, since the President is not 
the prosecutor’s client, he nonetheless insisted on independence through 
professional norms. 
Although Ervin’s bill never passed, the sentiment behind it made its 
way into departmental policies. The desire to preserve and nurture indepen-
dence translated into a set of institutional rules. President Carter cam-
paigned in part on the promise to take politics out of the administration of 
justice, and his Attorney General, Griffin Bell, attempted to implement that 
promise.351 In a speech to DOJ lawyers, he affirmed his faith in the 
professional expertise of his audience: 
I believe that our primary mission is to serve the Government as profes-
sionals, to exercise our independent judgment and to do our duty as we 
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348.  Id. at 149 (statement of Charles E. Goodell); id. at 153 (statement of Nicholas Katzenbach). 
349.  Id. at 168 (statement of Ramsey Clark). 
350.  Id. at 199 (statement of Archibald Cox). 
351.  The Honorable Griffin B. Bell, U.S. Att’y Gen, Address before Department of Justice 
Lawyers 4 (Sept. 6, 1978) (transcript available at https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/ 
2011/08/23/09-06-1978b.pdf). 
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see it. But the partisan activities of some Attorneys General in this cen-
tury, combined with the unfortunate legacy of Watergate, have given rise 
to an understandable public concern that some decisions at Justice may be 
the products of favor, or pressure, or politics.352 
He continued: 
I believe that we in the Department are faithful to a high standard of 
professionalism. I know from personal observation that the lawyers at 
Justice are fiercely professional, steadfastly independent in their legal 
judgment, regardless of outside pressures or controversy.353 
With these inspirational thoughts in mind, he proposed several new 
policies to preserve the independence of DOJ lawyers. First, he suggested 
that all communications about particular cases from Congress or the White 
House should be filtered through the Attorney General or his immediate 
subordinates. Any disagreements between prosecutors and their supervisors 
should be memorialized and reported. Benjamin Civiletti, who took over 
from Bell in 1979, memorialized Bell’s policy suggestions.354 
The Bar responded to revelations of the Watergate scandal with 
increased commitment to ethics. It convened a new committee to study and 
make recommendations on how to protect law enforcement from political 
influence.355 Remarking that violations of ethical norms were so blatant, the 
President of the American Bar Association, Robert Meserve, commented 
that the solution was not a revision of the rules but rather a renewed 
commitment to independence: “The first lesson of Watergate for [lawyers] 
may be that we must constantly preserve our professional independence 
and detachment—not only from the over-zealous client who seeks what is 
improper, but from the urgings of our own ambition and self-interest.”356 
Again, observers conflate professional independence with personal 
integrity. Analyzing how so many lawyers could have participated in illegal 
conduct, Meserve speculated that exposure to politics may have led them to 
forget the professional detachment that accompanies law practice.357 
Praising former Attorney General Elliot Richardson, the incoming 
President of the Bar insisted on professional independence. He rooted this 
obligation not in the distinct nature of law but rather in the “traditions of 
 
352.  Id. at 3. 
353.  Id. at 4. 
354.  Memorandum from Benjamin R. Civiletti, U.S. Att’y Gen., to Heads of Offices, Bds., 
Bureaus, & Divs. (Oct. 18, 1979), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2011/08/23/10-
18-1979.pdf. 
355.  Robert W. Meserve, Action 1972–73—American Bar Association, 59 A.B.A. J. 986, 986 
(1973). 
356.  Watergate Is Focus of Attention at the Annual Meeting, 18 A.B.A. NEWS, Sept. 1973, at 4 
(alteration in original). 
357.  Robert W. Meserve, Watergate: Lessons and Challenges for the Legal Profession, 59 
A.B.A. J. 681, 681 (1973). 
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the legal profession.”358 Insofar as independence denoted something 
distinct from character, it was rooted in the nature of a lawyer’s job and the 
routines of practice. 
G. After Watergate 
In the scandals that comprise recent history, the concept of 
prosecutorial independence forms both the basis for outrage and the 
solution. In the aftermath of Watergate, the term has evolved to denote, 
primarily, independence from presidential control. Congress toyed with 
whether court-appointed special prosecutors are necessary to protect prose-
cutorial independence, and in 1978, it experimented with the Ethics in 
Government Act, which mandated such a solution. But when it allowed the 
law to sunset, Congress recognized the cost that the Act had to political 
accountability. While how best to attain it remained in dispute, there was 
little controversy over the goal: preserving professional discretion from the 
power of interested executive officials. The solution for conflicts of interest 
in government officials was prosecutorial independence, rather than a 
separate independent agency. 
The tides rise and fall, and by the time President Reagan took office, 
the alarm prompted by Watergate had subsided. President Reagan sought to 
increase the power of the Executive and consolidate control over it. Edwin 
Meese, President Reagan’s loyal supporter and Attorney General from 
1983 to 1987, allegedly tipped off the White House about an investigation 
into the Iran–Contra controversy.359 
But throughout this period in which the President exercised strong 
executive control, prosecutorial independence remained an important 
check—a tradition and norm that assumed, and deserves, a more 
permanent, unmalleable role in the law.360 In December 2006, President 
George W. Bush tried to fire seven United States Attorneys at once.361 
Critics recoiled at the targeted removal of individual prosecutors in the 
middle of the President’s term.362 Members of both parties criticized what 
 
358.  Smith: Restore the Prosecutor, 18 AM. BAR. NEWS, Nov. 1973, at 12. 
359.  HOUSE SELECT COMM. TO INVESTIGATE COVERT ARMS, TRANSACTIONS WITH IRAN & 
SENATE SELECT COMM. ON SECRET MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO IRAN & THE NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION, 
REPORT OF THE CONG. COMMS. INVESTIGATING THE IRAN–CONTRA AFFAIR, H.R. REP. NO. 100-433, at 
305 (1987). 
360.  In arguing that certain government officials can be removed by the President despite their 
work for quasi-judicial entities, the Office of Legal Counsel has reaffirmed the notion that prosecutorial 
independence is sufficient to protect against corruption. See Presidential Appointees—Removal 
Power—Civil Serv. Reform Act—Constitutional Law (Article II, § 2, cl. 2), 2 Op. O.L.C. 120, 121 
(1978). 
361.  Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independence, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1163, 1202 
(2013). 
362.  Id. 
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seemed like a failure to respect the nonpartisan character of local 
prosecutors’ offices, and after extensive hearings, Attorney General 
Alberto Gonzales was forced to resign.363 Replacing many United States 
Attorneys as an incoming president remains common practice—a means of 
ensuring that administration priorities are honored.364 But when a president 
fires individual prosecutors at later points, it is suspect, largely because it 
seems as if the President is infusing impermissible partisan concerns into 
individual cases.365 As Adrian Vermeule argues with regard to agencies, the 
convention of prosecutorial independence has become a part of the 
structure of American government.366 
III. POLICY REASONS FOR PROSECUTORIAL INDEPENDENCE 
The tradition of prosecutorial independence has evolved from the 
inchoate reality of prosecution in the early republic into a way to protect 
against partisan corruption and, finally, as a check on presidential power. 
The values behind the separation of powers were buttressed by the norm of 
prosecutorial independence as the reality of criminal law enforcement 
changed.367 Prosecutorial independence is essential to protect those values 
by preserving individual liberty and preventing the accumulation of power. 
The structure of American government is so vastly different now than 
it was at the founding that we cannot protect liberty and avoid tyranny 
without accounting for the historical development of our institutions. 
Prosecutorial independence has evolved to prevent any individual or group 
from amassing too much power—the goal of the separation-of-powers 
doctrine.368 Allowing a President to control the investigation and prose-
cution of members of his own Administration, for instance, epitomizes just 
the sort of accumulation of power that James Madison and others hoped to 
thwart.369 Although proponents of the unitary Executive claim that political 
accountability will provide a meaningful check on federal enforcement 
 
363.  Id. 
364.  Id. at 1201–02. 
365.  Id. at 1202–03. 
366.  Id. at 1201–03. 
367.  For a discussion of the importance of unwritten norms, see id. at 1218–32. For an argument 
that the Madisonian goal of avoiding tyranny at the heart of the separation-of-powers doctrine ought to 
inform the Supreme Court’s analysis of any issue involving the structure of government, see Rebecca L. 
Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1513, 1516 (1991). 
368.  See generally Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725 (1996) 
(explaining the policy goal of the separation-of-powers doctrine was to prevent the accumulation of 
power and arguing that checks on executive power fulfill those original goals). 
369.  In Federalist 47, James Madison wrote, “The accumulation of all powers, legislative, 
executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, 
self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.” THE FEDERALIST 
NO. 47, at 313 (James Madison) (Modern Library ed. 1937). 
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power,370 prosecutors cannot generally be held politically accountable 
because their discretionary decisions are rarely publicly justified and often 
entirely opaque. It is even harder to hold a politician politically accountable 
for the acts of prosecutors. 
The historical evidence in Part II suggests that the unitary theory of the 
Executive does not have as long a pedigree as its proponents argue, at least 
with regard to criminal law enforcement.371 Of course, Christopher Yoo, 
Steven Calebresi, and others have recounted important incidents where 
presidents exerted their control over the federal bureaucracy, but that is 
unsurprising. What is more notable is that these efforts failed. There were 
pockets of independence and separate fiefdoms of power. Because of the 
decentralized nature of their work, early federal prosecutors, attorneys 
general, and later DOJ lawyers were among those who resisted presidential 
control. Far from being consolidated under presidential control, most 
federal criminal prosecution in the early republic was local, and many cases 
were brought by state actors and private individuals. 
Scholarship on the allocation of power within the Executive recognizes 
that checks and balances come, not only from competition between the 
three branches, but from the competing structures and actors within each 
branch. Administrative law seeks to exploit this division of power.372 By 
allocating responsibility to different professionals, experts, career civil 
servants, and political appointees, administrative law recognizes the 
potential for those with expertise and experience to counteract partisan 
incentives, while preserving political accountability. Particularly, know-
ledge and experience are central to the impartial exposition of facts. And 
facts, in turn, are critical to the transparency needed to ensure true political 
accountability. 
Official discretion may pose a cost to efficiency, but it is one we are 
willing to make to ensure the public interest. Justice Brandeis explained in 
his dissent in Myers, 
The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the Convention 
of 1787 not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary 
power. The purpose was not to avoid friction, but, by means of the 
inevitable friction incident to the distribution of the governmental powers 
among three departments, to save the people from autocracy.373 
 
370.  Andrias, supra note 53, at 1108–09; Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 121, at 543–50; 
CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 11, at 3. 
371.  Mark Tushnet, A Political Perspective on the Theory of the Unitary Executive, 12 U. Pᴀ. J. 
Cᴏɴsᴛ. L. 313, 314, 318–23 (2010). 
372.  Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power Within Agencies, 120 YALE L.J. 
1032 (2011); Michaels, supra note 11. 
373.  Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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The discretion of United States Attorneys and line prosecutors 
promotes the fair and even-handed administration of justice.374 Albeit 
imperfect, professional judgment provides the strongest protection for the 
value of impartial justice. Prosecutors wield massive power. We expect 
them to sort through facts and judge the credibility of witnesses. Their job 
demands that they exercise their discretion based on these facts, free from 
all bias, including partisan interest. To preserve a fair criminal justice 
system, prosecutors are trained to be consistent across cases and to exercise 
their judgment in light of broad principles, such as proportionality. This is 
not an easy task; American prosecutors sometimes fail;375 but presidential 
influence over individual cases would only make matters worse.376 
As H.L.A. Hart explained in a recently discovered essay, official 
discretion is not the same as whim.377 Discretion involves practical 
wisdom, the effort to do something wise or sound, and drawing on 
experience and expertise to solve a problem. Having made similar choices 
repeatedly under the same conditions and institutional restraints, certain 
individuals are trained to make thoughtful decisions with a careful eye 
toward potential hazards.378 Discretion, Hart argues, is not a threat to the 
rule of law but rather both necessary to and consistent with it.379 But it has 
to rest with the actors who are best situated to draw on experience and 
expertise to make principled decisions in light of particular sets of facts. 
Institutions and structures of government can promote this kind of reasoned 
decision-making by dispersing responsibility among the appropriate 
actors.380 Hart’s essay provides a jurisprudential defense of intra-branch 
checks and balances.381 
Prosecutors enjoy vast discretion. In determining what justice requires, 
prosecutors must identify and prioritize societal aims, like safety, 
 
374.  Green & Roiphe, supra note 9. 
375.  Angela Davis has argued that the problem with prosecutors is their lack of accountability. 
Davis, supra note 32, at 395–400. But even she proposes transparency as the solution rather than 
executive control over decision-making. Id. at 460–64. 
376.  Social media has allowed the President an unprecedented influence, even absent a mandate 
to direct individual cases. By repeatedly calling the investigation into Russian meddling in the 2016 
election a “witch hunt” on social media, the President has asserted his political influence. By tweeting a 
demand for an investigation into whether the FBI and DOJ “infiltrated” his campaign, see Donald 
Trump (@realdonaldtrump), TWITTER (May 20, 2018, 11:13 AM), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/ 
status/998256454590193665?lang=en, President Trump has all but attempted to take over the legal 
department. While there is no proof that individual investigators or prosecutors have been influenced by 
these public declarations, it is a clear violation of the DOJ regulations designed to insulate individual 
prosecutors from partisan influence.  
377.  See Hart, supra note 9, at 656–64. 
378.  Id. at 657. 
379.  Id. 
380.  Geoffrey C. Shaw, H.L.A. Hart’s Lost Essay: Discretion and the Legal Process School, 127 
Hᴀʀᴠ. L. Rᴇᴠ. 666, 706–07 (2013). 
381.  Id. at 674–75. 
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individual liberty, the preservation of government resources, deterrence, 
retribution, and rehabilitation. In addition, they have to determine whether 
certain conduct fits within a criminal statute. Our system vests this discre-
tion in prosecutors because, in theory, their experience, expertise, and 
proximity to the facts situate them well to make these determinations. 
While they often disappoint,382 others might well do worse. The more 
focused an individual is on personal or political gain, the more likely that 
this exercise of discretion will be distorted, priorities warped, and factual 
determinations skewed.383 
Prosecutors are trained to exercise their discretion in a disinterested 
way, but conflicts of interest threaten to undermine this impartial decision-
making. Partisan political interests create conflicts by infusing impermis-
sible personal and political ambitions into decisions that ought to be made 
in the public interest. As Lloyd Cutler noted during the hearings on Senator 
Ervin’s proposal to create an independent law department after Watergate, 
it makes little sense to interpret the separation-of-powers doctrine to “force 
us to tolerate conflicts of interest on the part of the President, the Attorney 
General and their immediate assistants that we cannot and do not tolerate in 
ordinary judges and lawyers.”384 
The President and his political appointees are more susceptible than 
prosecutors to illegitimate political motivations. Allocating responsibility 
for decisions in individual cases to career prosecutors who are lower down 
in the hierarchy helps achieve the fair and disinterested administration of 
criminal justice by making these sorts of conflicts less likely. The DOJ 
regulations developed in the aftermath of Watergate similarly serve as 
prophylactics, protecting United States Attorneys and their assistants from 
political pressure.385 
The traditional view of separation of powers evolved as the 
administrative state changed. The role of experts and professionals within 
government complicates the initial understanding. There are several 
 
382.  The literature on the damage wrought by prosecutors is vast. See, e.g., Green & 
Yaroshefsky, supra note 33, at 656–72 (discussing the new rhetoric about prosecutorial wrongdoing). 
383.  Green & Roiphe, supra note 9, at 472. 
384.  Removing Politics from the Admin. of Justice: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Separation of Powers of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 241 (1974). 
385.  For instance, former FBI Director James Comey chose not to widely circulate his 
memorialized conversation with President Trump, in which the President asked him to back off the 
Michael Flynn investigation, within the office because he was concerned about impermissible political 
considerations infiltrating the FBI and United States attorneys’ offices. Open Hearing with Former FBI 
Director James Comey: Hearing Before S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 115th Cong. 19 (2017). He 
saw his role, in part, as gatekeeper, preventing partisan concerns from drifting down into individual 
decisions that ought to be made for other reasons. See id. Rod Rosenstein, similarly, has defended 
Special Counsel Robert Mueller. Spencer Ackerman, Mueller’s Boss Pledges to Protect Russia Probe 
Against GOP: ‘I Would Not’ Fire Him, THE DAILY BEAST (Dec. 13, 2017), https://www.thedailybeast. 
com /rod-rosenstein-pledges-to-protect-muellers-russia-probe-against-gop-i-would-not-fire-him. 
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problems with the argument for a unitary Executive, in addition to its 
inconsistency with the historical tradition of prosecutorial independence 
discussed in Part II. Traditional checks and balances do not always work. 
The idea behind three coequal branches was, essentially, to create different 
zones of power, each competing for authority and checking the others 
along the way. But, as scholars have argued, Congress has grown increas-
ingly passive, especially after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. In an age of 
partisan politics, Congress is even more likely to abdicate its power when 
the same party controls both Congress and the Executive Branch. Without 
effective legislative and judicial checks, there is an even greater need to 
police political actors to ensure that they comply with the law. Lawyers can 
and do serve this role. They (along with other experts in the administrative 
state) have evolved into a separate zone of power. Courts and legislators 
should read the law and design the structure of government to protect this 
role. 
The history of the prosecutorial independence in Part II suggests that 
this is not an accidental twist. The American state has always been diffuse, 
and the myriad zones of power have always comprised substantial and 
important checks on power.386 The three separate branches were designed 
to balance accountability with checks on potential abuses of power. Since 
the founding, but particularly since 1870, lawmakers viewed prosecutorial 
discretion as a piece of this puzzle. In creating the DOJ, Congress believed 
that the consolidation of prosecutorial power under the Executive would 
foster professional values, which, in turn, would prevent the abuses of 
personal and partisan interest. 
The effort to exert total control over the DOJ is part of a larger pattern 
in which the current President has undermined the institutions of demo-
cracy and the rule of law by insisting that all decisions with which he does 
not agree are motivated by political animus and whim. He attacked the 
credibility of Judge Gonzalo Curiel, who presided over the class action 
lawsuits against Trump University.387 He criticized judges who overruled 
his travel ban388 and has repeatedly attacked the FBI and other law 
enforcement agencies.389 Faith in the fair administration of justice is critical 
to the rule of law and democracy. Preserving prosecutorial independence is 
 
386.  Novak, supra note 289. 
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one way to ensure the disinterested and even-handed application of 
criminal law. 
CONCLUSION 
The history of the American administrative state in general and federal 
prosecution in particular includes competing themes. Since the founding, 
proponents of a strong consolidated Executive have vied with those who 
advocate significant checks on executive power. Politics and expediency 
often propelled that debate. As this central disagreement made its way into 
the twentieth century, however, official independence, expertise, and 
professionalism took on an increasingly important role. 
At the beginning, prosecutorial independence was almost taken for 
granted, a product of the scattered, local nature of federal prosecution. 
While individual presidents did interfere in prosecutions, their ability to do 
so was limited. As federal criminal law grew more complex, legislators and 
critics recognized the need for national organization to combat waste, 
inefficiency, and corruption. The professional expert nature of the DOJ was 
critical to its mission from its inception. As the New Deal government 
expanded, the allocation of power among units within the Executive 
became vital to preserve the legitimacy of the system. Prosecutorial inde-
pendence developed as a central norm during this period. In the aftermath 
of Watergate, legislators elaborated on the notion of professional indepen-
dence as a fundamental check on presidential power. 
Congress has acknowledged and acquiesced in the DOJ’s indepen-
dence. DOJ regulations articulated by Bell and implemented by Civiletti 
are more than mere etiquette. These professional norms of practice are a 
fundamental component of a functioning democracy and a key check on the 
accumulation of power. 
As politicians, scholars, and lawyers concluded in the hearings after the 
Watergate scandal, fully isolating the DOJ from the Executive might 
diminish political accountability. But political accountability is meaning-
less unless investigators and prosecutors are independent of politics, free to 
find and publicize facts according to a strict process and without the 
distortion and spin of politics. Respect for prosecutorial independence and 
professional norms deserves significant weight in interpreting the law 
governing the allocation of criminal justice power between the President, 
the Attorney General, and other federal prosecutors. 
As the criminal justice system changed throughout the twentieth 
century, the meaning of prosecutorial independence shifted as well, grow-
ing to denote personal integrity and a method of thinking critically about 
certain kinds of problems. While prosecutors sometimes fail to live up to 
expectations, they are better situated than the President to make sound, 
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disinterested prosecutorial decisions in individual cases in light of the 
evidence and prosecutorial policies and traditions. 
The history and policy strongly suggest that, as a general matter, the 
Attorney General and subordinate prosecutors may not accept direction 
from the President but must make the ultimate decisions about how to 
conduct individual investigations and prosecutions, even at the risk of 
being fired for disobeying the President. The Constitution does not 
determine whether ultimate authority rests with the President or the 
prosecutors, leaving Congress to decide. Congress has not explicitly 
answered the question, but its silence since the late nineteenth century in 
the face of the evolving importance of prosecutorial independence suggests 
that Congress has acquiesced in a relationship in which the President may 
express views to the Attorney General, but the ultimate authority rests with 
the Attorney General or with subordinate prosecutors to whom the 
Attorney General delegates authority. 
In the first two hypotheticals posed by Part I, the Attorney General 
must disregard and disobey the President’s direction to indict a political 
opponent or to dismiss charges against a political ally because the Presi-
dent’s motivations are partisan and because conventional prosecutorial 
norms and policies dictate a different result. The hard question, which we 
leave for another day, is posed by the last hypothetical, in which the 
President, pursuing legitimate foreign policy objectives, directs prosecutors 
to file espionage charges that are weak but supported by probable cause. 
This scenario creates a tension between the President’s enumerated power 
under the Constitution and the Attorney General’s implied authority under 
legislation. Here, some perceive, presidential preeminence is a necessity. 
Perhaps so. But absent such a powerful presidential claim of constitutional 
authority, history and policy suggest that prosecutors must answer to the 
law, not the President. 
